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Abstract
Essays on Inequality, Growth, and Economic Policy
by
Philipp Emanuel Erfurth

Adviser: Professor Christos Giannikos

This dissertation consists of three chapters that study inequality and regional economics
in a historical and development context.
The first chapter examines regional inequality among Habsburg regions from the 19th
century to today’s EU by using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) software to recreate
historical regions in present-day projections. The findings suggests that regional disparities
are markedly higher today than in the 19th century, despite rapid convergence in the past
two decades. The study thus provides evidence of retrospective determinism in the study of
the Habsburg economy and suggests that, although regional EU policy has been successful
over the past two decades, further policy measures are needed to make up lost ground. For
the 1867-1913 time-frame, the study finds two regional convergence clubs.
The second chapter provides a comprehensive study of the linkages between unification
and related policy choices on income inequality by examining the cases of Italy and Germany
in the context of nineteenth century unification. To conduct this analysis, the study puts
forward - for the first time - estimates of income inequality for pre-unification German states
using social tables, compiled using primary data, some of which have thus far been unexplored
in economic research. The findings suggest that differences in inequality between regions
were more pronounced in Italy than in Germany. In seeking explanations for these trends,
the study explores linkages between institutional structures, governance frameworks and
inequality, connecting the research on federalism with the literature on inequality extraction.

v
The third chapter provides new insights into subnational inequality convergence across
developing countries, building on the increased availability of Luxembourg Income Study
(LIS) data. It finds evidence of regional inequality convergence across countries, but finds
heterogenous trends within countries. The study uses convergence club analysis to complement ”traditional” convergence analysis and advances the methodology as a useful tool for
policy makers at the regional level. It also explores the role of regional policy making on
regional inequality trends, providing some preliminary evidence that the state system matters for inequality convergence, suggesting that unitary states are associated with regional
inequality convergence.
The three chapters aim to provide new insights and contribute to the study of inequality
by advancing our understanding of the relationship between the distribution of income,
regional economic development and state systems.
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Chapter 1
Convergence in Habsburg Regions,
1870-2018
”There’s nothing peculiar about the Monarchy. (..) so far as Austria-Hungary is concerned,
the ostensibly peculiar is perfectly natural. It’s only in this crazy Europe of nation-states and
nationalists that the natural looks peculiar.” The Emperor’s Tomb, Joseph Roth (1938)

1.1

Introduction

The economic historiography of the Habsburg empire has been marked by a long-standing debate over the contribution of the empire’s economic development to the monarchy’s eventual
demise in 1918 - a theme that can rarely be addressed without a faint fragrance of retrospective determinism in the air or what Judson (2016) refers to as a ”tradition of pathologizing the
Habsburg Empire as teetering on the verge of collapse” (P.12). This tradition has straddled
political, social and economic paths of inquiry, with observers such as Jaszi (1929) arguing
that the empire was already doomed economically before entering WWI, pointing to the
”notion that inter-regional inequality (..) undermined the coherence and performance of the
1
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Habsburg economy which, ultimately, only served to accelerate the empire’s demise” (Schulze
and Wolf, 2012). No efforts have thus far been undertaken to study these inequalities across
all Habsburg regions over an extended period of time.
In addition to its ambiguous historiography, the Habsburg empire also provides an intriguing showcase for the study of economic development of a heterogenous and multi-ethnic
state-entity, comprised of different cultural contexts and patterns of economic development,
similar to the contemporary realities of the European Union. The ideological foundations of
the EU closely mirror the notions of supra-national legitimacy embodied in the Habsburg
empire, revealed for instance in the pioneering writings of Karl Deutsch, committed proEuropean and Czech-born son of the empire himself, who saw in the European project ”the
recreation of Austro-Hungary in a section of the world polity” (Riga and Hall, 2016).
In this vein, the above quote from Joseph Roth’s influential 1938 novel The Emperor’s
Tomb could apply as much to the European Union today as to the historical Habsburg empire. The nationalistic undercurrents in the European Union, including in former Habsburg
regions, are testament to the notion that nationalism makes ”the natural” as Roth calls it,
i.e. a union of common interest among European peoples, look ”peculiar”. Indeed, some are
arguing that the Habsburg empire’s demise represents a cautionary tale for the EU (see The
Economist, 2018). Yet, despite these similarities, no comprehensive attempts have been undertaken thus far to compare and contrast regional economic development in the EU and the
Habsburg empire for a fixed set of regions over time. This research will provide insights into
disparities in growth in Habsburg regions, both within the context of the Austro-Hungarian
empire as well as the European Union.
The contributions of the paper to the literature on regional economic growth, convergence
and inequality are threefold: First, it takes a historical perspective on regional differences
and applies scholarship on convergence and convergence clubs to historical GDP data of
the Habsburg Empire. Second, it uses Geographic Information Systems (GIS) software to
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recreate historical regions, thus allowing for convergence analysis over an extended period for
historical Habsburgian regions from 1870 until today. Thirdly, by drawing on this analysis
over an extended time horizon, it enables the comparison of regional differences between
Habsburg and European Union regions.

1.2

Literature review: A short historiography of the
Habsburg economy

There is extensive literature on the economic history of the Habsburg empire Empire (e.g.
Good, 1984; Komlos, 1983; Schulze, 2000 & 2007) as well as scholarship on inequality among
Habsburg regions (e.g. Good, 1984; Good and Ma, 1991; Klein et al., 2018; Cvrcek, 2013).
Views on the economic development of the empire have differed with regards to the progression of industrialization and its origins as well as the drivers of economic development of
the empire as a whole and across regions. Many scholars have thereby specifically focused
on the role of the Habsburg economy in the eventual demise of the empire in 1918, including Gershenkron (1977) and the afore-mentioned Jaszi (1929). This section will provide a
brief overview of the literature on economic development of the empire as a whole and of its
regions.

1.2.1

Economic development in the 19th century

The overall economic development trajectory of the Habsburg empire has been subject to
debate, with a number of scholars, including Gershenkron (1977), advancing negative assessments of the empire’s economic development, while others have been offering a more
nuanced view. As Pollard (1981) stresses, ”that extraordinary patchwork quilt of nations and
economies, the Habsburg Empire, could not only show examples of economic development
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from the most backward to almost the most advanced in Europe, it was also progressing even
before the 1870s with reasonable speed.” Yet, as Komlos (1983) notes, economic development
did not advance in a pattern that is commonly associated with an industrial revolution, as
observed in other European nations. The industrial development of the Habsburg monarchy
did not benefit from linkage effects across industries and the overall growth performance was
not characterized by a sudden jump in aggregate output, but rather by a gradual upswing.
As Komlos (1983) argues, speaking in economic development paradigms, there was thus
neither a Rostowian take-off nor a Gerschenkronian great-spurt (see Komlos, 1983, Page
109).
Across different periods, the economic development of the Habsburg empire was characterized by heterogeneity. The period between the end of the Napoleonic wars and the
upheavals of 1848, referred to as Vormärz, saw an advancement of industrialization in the
empire (Good, 1984). As Good (1984) and Schulze (2007) note, during this period, the
economic situation of the Habsburg empire was comparable to other European states, with
some Habsburg regions in the West of the empire possibly being better off economically than
Prussia (Schulze, 2007, P. 190). Economic growth during the Vormärz was fueled in part by
accelerating technological change and economic integration fostered by railway construction
(Good, 1984).
The decade following the upheavals of 1848, which triggered profound changes throughout
most of Europe, was an era of reform. As Good (1984) notes, scholars in the marxist tradition
have argued that the end of the ancién regime in 1848 reigned in the industrial age in the
empire. There was a push towards greater economic integration, which included reforms
to trade, the emancipation of peasants and changes to transportation policy. The latter
included the railroad concession law, which unlocked investments into railroads and aimed
to create backward and forward linkages in industry. The reforms also crucially included
the elimination of tariffs between Austria and Hungary, which established a customs union
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between the two crown-lands. The abolition of the tariffs was in part a response to the rapid
acceleration of intra-empire trade in the two preceding decades (Komlos, 1983).
An important reform in 1867 was the Austro-Hungarian compromise, which established
the dual monarchy under which the Hungarian lands, referred to as Transleithania, were to
be governed from Budapest and the Austrian crown lands, called Cisleithania, from Vienna.
The compromise of 1867 redrew the map of the empire, separating the Habsburg monarchy
into two parts.1 Some have pointed to the inherent fragility of this institutional arrangement,
such as Gerschenkron (1977), who argued that ”erected in a hurry by inept architects, the
duplex house (..) of the Dual Monarchy began to reveal manifold structural inadequacies
almost as soon as the building was completed” (P. 9). Inarguably, however, the AustroHungarian compromise provided the backdrop for an economic boom within the empire,
exemplified by the establishment of 552 banks and 170 industrial corporations between 1867
and 1873 as well as an unprecedented increase in investments, including in railways. The
bubble burst in 1873, when the Vienna Stock Exchange crashed, triggering the Panic of 1873
- a wide-spread economic depression across Europe and the US (Judson, 2016).
The financial crisis of 1873 triggered a deep and prolonged recession, particularly in the
Austrian part of the empire. As many scholars have noted (see e.g. Good, 1984; Schulze,
2000; Klein et al. 2017), the crisis led to a change in growth dynamics within the empire,
which the next subsection will discuss in greater detail. From around 1896 onwards the
Austrian economy saw a modest recovery (Good, 1984). Yet, overall, the GDP of Austria
grew at only about 1% per year in the four decades leading up to WWI, which was below-par
compared to other European nations (Schulze, 2000). Accordingly, Austria’s relative income
1
The regions of the Austrian part of the empire were far dispersed. The largest city of Bukovina, Czernowitz (now Chernivtsi, located in Western Ukraine), was over 1200 km away from Bregenz, the most
Western city of the empire and 700 km air distance away from Vienna, even though the construction of a
railway, which was concluded in 1866, brought the city within a 24h train ride from Vienna.The same journey
by train would nowadays take over 28 hours and entail at least 4 changes in trains, including in Bratislava
(Slovakia), Kosice (Slovakia), Uzghorod (Ukraine) and L’viv (Ukraine). A kingdom for the Austro-Hungarian
railways!
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position worsened in comparison to European peers, such as Germany, France and Italy (see
Schulze, 2000, P. 324-325). Schulze (2007) argues that over this time frame productivity
growth, particularly growth in total factor productivity (TFP), was lower in Austria than
in Germany. Aggregate productivity growth was stifled by the agricultural sector which was
characterized by low rates of capital formation (ibid, P. 204).

1.2.2

Regional heterogeneity

A number of studies have also focused on economic differences between regions, including
Good (1987), Good (1994) and Schulze (2018) for Austrian regions. As noted by Good
(1984), disparities between regions widened between 1750 and the mid-19th century, driven
by the industrialization of the Western regions of the empire. The Bohemian lands in particular solidified their position of ”industrial preeminence” (Good, 1984, P. 132) within the
empire, due to the favorable geographic position and bolstered by the emergence of a chemical
industry. The mid 19th-century saw an acceleration in industrialization in Eastern regions,
however some Hungarian regions only embarked on a path of industrialization after the late
1860s. As Klein et al. (2017) argue, an ”imaginary line between the ’core’ and ’the periphery’
ran through the Habsburg economy from the west/northwest to the east/southeast, reflecting
the pattern of diffusion of modern economic growth (P. 2). The Western regions were able to
take advantage of agglomeration economies as well as a larger stock of human capital (Klein
et al., 2017).
The divergent trajectories of economic growth and industrialization were also reflected
in heterogenous levels of living standards across regions. Cvrcek (2013) finds no evidence
of convergence in living standards across the empire as a whole after the 1850s. While the
Western regions of the empire witnessed increases in living standards, doubling in some
regions such as Bohemia between the 1850s and 1910, the Eastern regions did not exhibit
a similar trend of increased standards of living. As argued by Cvrcek (2013), Hungarian
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regions only saw ”periodic upswings such as in the mid-to-late 1860s and again in early
1880s but never launched on a path of sustained growth in living standards” (P. 23).
As noted in research by a number of scholars (e.g. Good, 1984; Schulze, 2000; Ciccarelli
and Missiaia, 2018; Klein et al., 2017), the financial crisis of 1873 led to a change in growth
patterns between the Hungarian and Austrian parts of the empire. As Schulze (2000) and
others note, the financial crisis triggered a prolonged recession in the Austrian part of the
empire. As Austrian investors’ preference shifted towards safe assets, Hungary saw large-scale
capital inflows, favoring industrialization in the Hungarian part of the empire (Schulze, 2000).
Ciccarelli and Missiaia (2018) argue that there was evidence of a Krugman specialization
effect (see Krugman, 1991) due to the financial crisis, which resulted in a fall in the correlation
of regional business cycles across the empire. From the 1890s onwards, Austrian regions once
again witnessed an increase in economic growth, while Hungarian regions’ rate of growth
decreased, thus reversing the trend (Schulze, 2000).
There is also a small number of studies that examine heterogenous growth trajectories
in the empire from a long-term perspective (see Good, 1994; Klein et al., 2017 and Schulze,
2018). The research by Good (1994) provides 19th century GDP data for Habsburg successor countries, including Austria, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, on the basis of
a proxy approach that uses other European countries as benchmark. Pammer (1997) provides a critique of Good’s approach, arguing that the proxy-data approach ”does not offer a
reliable technique for income estimation and international or interregional comparison” (P.
454), especially for comparing more advanced European regions with the Habsburg economy.
Klein et al. (2017) examines industrial development from 1870 to 2005, arguing that the
slow diffusion of industrialization from West to East within the empire had lasting effects on
Eastern European economies throughout the 19th century, noting the role of agglomeration
economies and human capital stock in explaining heterogeneity in industrialization trajectories (P. 6). The study by Schulze (2018) analyzes regional differences between 1870 and
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2014 among the nine regions of contemporary Austria only2 . The study finds a decline in
the coefficient of variation among regions to less than half of 1870 levels, driven in part by
a shift in the balance from Eastern towards Western Austrian regions.

1.3
1.3.1

Methodology: Converging on a framework
Beta convergence

A useful starting point for the study of differences in GDP per capita over time is the
literature on convergence, building on the work by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). The
authors show that in a neoclassical growth model poorer countries/regions should exhibit
higher rates of per capita growth than richer countries/regions, as richer states face decreasing
returns to capital per worker and poorer states benefit from the application of existing
technologies.
The principal argument of the theory is that countries and states would naturally converge to a common steady state, as would be predicted by a neoclassical growth model.
Countries and states further below the steady-state position would grow faster than others,
if countries have similar preferences and technology. Within the framework, poorer regions
or countries would then catch-up through the adoption of existing technology and more rapid
capital accumulation, having a lower initial level of output. This can be tested in the context
of a model that includes Cobb-Douglas technology, which can be represented as follows (see
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992):

log

yit
yi,t−1



= ai − (1 − e−β ) ∗ [log(yi,t−1 ) − xi ∗ (t − 1)] + uit

(1.1)

where yi represents output, xi the rate of exogenous, labor augmenting technological progress,
2

Burgenland, Carinthia, Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Vienna, Salzburg, Styria, Tyrol and Voralberg
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∗

uit the disturbance term and ai = xi + (1 − e−β )log(ŷi ). The higher the coefficient for beta,
the greater will be the response of the average rate of growth to the steady state (see Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). While there may be cases where it is necessary to distinguish
between conditional and absolute convergence, this is unlikely to be the case in the context of
subnational regions, rather than countries, as it is assumed that preferences and technology,
as well as the steady state, are similar across regions within a single state-entity.
Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s approach has been applied in a number of studies that have
tested the convergence hypothesis for a wide range of countries and states. While some
studies find convergence, particularly when it comes to US states (see for instance Kane,
2001), a large number of studies, such as Evans and Karras (1996), Dowrick and DeLong
(2003), Hall and Ludwig (2006) as well as Johnson and Papageorgiou (2019), have found
no evidence of unconditional convergence for a wide range of developed and developing
countries.

1.3.2

Convergence clubs

An area of more recent scholarship has gone beyond Barro and Sala-i-Martin by introducing a
variable term that allows for different convergence paths. It thus moves beyond the assumption that there is a single steady-state that countries and states would converge towards.
This could, for instance, be the case due to different speeds of convergence and differing
rates of technological growth, which would not be possible within a convergence model that
assumes homogenous convergence.
Following Phillips and Sul (2007), a model that allows for heterogenous technological
progress can be written as:

logyit = logyi∗ + (logyi0 − logyi∗ )eβit + logAit = ait + logAit

(1.2)
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where logyi * denotes the steady state log level of income and logyi0 the initial level. βit is
time-varying, which stands in contrast to the traditional model of convergence, and logAit
denotes technology accumulation. An important aspect of the model is the relation between
ait and logAit . The former term includes the transitional components, while the latter
captures the permanent components. Following Philips and Sul (2007), the term logAit can
be decomposed as:
logAit = logAi0 + γlogAt

(1.3)

where the current technology logAit is decomposed into an initial level of technological accumulation and the distance form the regions technology from publicly available technology,
which is denoted by γ, logAt (Phillips and Sul, 2007). Assuming that this latter term
grows at a rate that is constant, as suggested by Phillips and Sul (2007), then logyit can be
decomposed into a common and an idiosyncratic component:

logyit = δit µt

(1.4)

where δit denotes the transition parameter and µt denotes the common growth component
(see Phillips and Sul, 2007). Building on Bartowska and Riedl (2012), the transition parameter δit can be expressed as follows:

δit = δi +

σi ξit
L(t)tα

(1.5)

where δi is a fixed parameter, σi an idiosyncratic scale parameter , α the decay rate, i.e.
convergence rate, and L(t) a varying function (see Bartowska and Riedl, 2012). On the basis
of this specification, the null hypothesis of convergence can then be expressed as:
H0 : δi = δ and α ≥ 0
tested against the alternative hypothesis:
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HA : δi 6= δ and α < 0
As noted by Sichera and Pizzuto (2019) on the basis of Phillips and Sul’s (2007) model,
the log-t-test can be expressed as follows:

log

where

HA
Ht

HA
= α + βlogt + ut
Ht

(1.6)

denotes the variance ratio in the cross sectional setting and β the convergence

parameter associated with δit (see Sichera and Pizzuto, 2019, P. 143). This model can be
estimated using OLS.
If the log-t-test is rejected for convergence over the entire sample, the test is re-run for
the first k units, where k (2 < k < N ) is maximized so that the t value is larger than
−1.65. The result of this exercise is the identification of a core group. The remaining units
are then jointly tested with the log-t-test and if the condition of t is larger than −1.65 is
fulfilled, it makes up a second convergence club (see Sichera and Pizzuto, 2019, P. 143). The
methodology proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007) has been applied in a number of recent
studies of regional convergence. This includes Bartowska and Riedl (2009) and Artelaris at
al. (2010), who explore convergence clubs for the European Union.

1.3.3

Type II Gini coefficient

There is also a wide range of other measures that can be applied to identify disparities and
their respective trends across regions, including the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient
is widely used to measure inter-personal income and wealth inequalities, but can also be
utilized to measure the distribution of regional per-capita incomes. In the context of this
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study, the Type II Gini coefficient in line with Milanovic (2006) is denoted as:
n

G=

n

1 XX
(yj − yi )pi pj
µ i j>i

(1.7)

where yi represents mean income, i.e. GDP per capita, of a given region or country and pi
the share of the region’s population in the overall country.
This type II Gini, used for the purpose of this study, in line with Milanovic (2006),
represents a Gini coefficient in which GDP per capita for a given region proxies mean income.
It weighs each country, or region in the context of this study, by its population. This Gini
coefficient applied in the regional context, can be expected to be lower than what is observed
in the measurement of income and wealth inequality, as GDP per capita across regions is
generally less unequally distributed than incomes or wealth across a population.

1.4

Convergence in the Habsburg empire, 1870-1910

As a multi-ethnic and heterogenous state entity, the Habsburg empire combined a number
of vastly different states under its regal umbrella. The empire thus represents a useful case
to test evidence on convergence and convergence clubs.

1.4.1

Data sources for Habsburg GDP

There are a number of studies that have put forward GDP estimates for regions of the
Habsburg empire, notably the research by Good (1994), Good and Ma (1998), Schulze
(2000) as well as Ciccarelli and Missiaia (2018).
The estimates for GDP for Habsburg regions put forward in Good (1994), Good and Ma
(1998) as well as Schulze (2000) mirror the census dates, i.e. provide coverage for the years
1870, 1880, 1890, 1900 and 1910. The estimates by Good (1994) and Good and Ma (1998)
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build on a Crafts-type structural equation approach using proxy variables. As mentioned
above, this approach in Good (1994) was subject to critique by Pammer (1997), leading
to revisions in Good and Ma (1998). Schulze (2000) moves beyond the proxy approach by
using regional shares in sector output, which are aggregated at the regional level to calculate
region’s GDP.
The study by Ciccarelli and Missiaia (2018) advances annual GDP data, but has a number
of important limitations. The data is constructed using business tax figures at current prices
from 1867 to 1913, but due to data availability is limited to the Austrian regions of the
empire. Hungarian regions’ annual data is not available. As the GDP estimates between
the census years are calculated using business taxes, the estimates vary with changes in
tax/GDP ratios over time and have a weak predictive capacity with regards to relative
differences between regions.

1.4.2

Testing for convergence

Figure 1.1 below shows the convergence analysis from 1870 to 1910 using the data by Schulze
(2000). Overall, the chart suggest a downward sloping relationship across the entire sample,
consistent with the convergence hypothesis. Yet, the regression results, reported in Table
1.1 suggest that the negative relationship is not significant, thus providing no support for
the hypothesis of convergence.
The regression results suggest that there are three outliers, namely Bukovina, Galicia and
Dalmatia, which exhibit low growth rates and low initial levels of GDP per capita. Indeed,
when dropping these three regions from the regression, there is strong evidence of convergence
across the empire, as reported in Table 1.1. This finding suggests that the reforms of the
1850s, including the opening of markets and greater policy autonomy following the AustroHungarian Compromise of 1867 (see Cieger, 2015 and Komlos, 1983), may have fostered
convergence in most regions, but failed to support catch-up of the three afore-mentioned
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Figure 1.1: Convergence across the Austro-Hungarian empire

Source: Data from Schulze (2000)

regions of Cisleithania.
Table 1.1 also reports results for convergence analysis of Transleithania and Cisleithania,
but finds no evidence of convergence within these parts of the empire. This suggests that
overall convergence across most regions was caused by a convergence of the Hungarian to
the Austrian part of the empire. This is in line with studies arguing that the aftermath of
the 1873 financial crisis favored growth in Hungarian regions (see e.g. Good, 1984; Schulze,
2000 and Klein et al., 2017).
Figure 1.2 below represents the convergence relationship on the basis of relative GDP
per capita (100=average). The figure shows regions consistent with high growth and low
initial income levels, and thus the convergence hypothesis, in the upper left hand (dark-
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Table 1.1: Convergence
Regions

Beta

Intercept

t-value

R-squared

N

Habsburg Empire

-0.5418
(0.3854)

2.7462**
(1.1870)

-1.406

0.08992

22

Transleithania

1.679
(1.304)

-3.774
(3.869)

1.288

0.1916

8

Cisleithania1

0.08892
(0.48801)

0.67768
(1.53053)

0.182

0.002759

14

Habsburg Empire
(Ex. Bu., Da., Ga.)

-1.3164***
(0.1984)

5.2249***
(0.6159)

-6.636

0.7215

19

green shaded) quadrant. The position of Hungarian regions marked in blue is consistent
with the notion that most Hungarian regions saw higher rates of growth compared to a large
number of Austrian regions. The three regions Galicia, Bukovina, and Dalmatia, which
exhibit low growth and low initial income levels, are located in the bottom right quadrant
(dark-red shaded), suggesting that despite initial low levels of GDP per capita their relative
position within the empire worsened.
Indeed, as the data suggest, the difference between the richest state, Lower Austria
(home to the Austrian capital Vienna) and the poorest state Dalmatia, on the South-Eastern
periphery of the Austrian empire. The GDP per capita of Lower Austria was more than 3.5
times higher than the GDP per capita of Dalmatia in 1870 and did not converge until 1910.
This difference is greater than the present-day difference between the states of New York
and Mississippi, as the GDP per capita of New York is a little over 2.25 times larger than
that of Mississippi (US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2020).
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Figure 1.2: Relative convergence (100=Average), 1870-1910

Source: Author’s elaboration, Data from Schulze, 2007

1.4.3

Testing for convergence clubs

The preceding analysis has provided evidence of a lack of convergence of the poorest to the
richest states in the Austrian empire − a hypothesis that we will now explore in depth using
the convergence clubs methodology outlined above. To test for convergence clubs in the
Austrian empire, the annual data by Ciccarelli and Missiaia (2018) can be used.
A first step is to determine the relative transition paths of the regions, which describe
the departures of the individual region from a common growth path (see Sichera & Pizzuto,
2019). Figure 1.3 shows the transition paths of the different regions. The graph suggests
some heterogeneity in the transition paths, particularly between the majority of regions and
a smaller number of trailing regions.
In order to test whether there is evidence of multiple convergence clubs, the test elaborated by Phillips and Sul (2007) can be applied, yielding the results shown in Table 1.2.
The results suggest that there are two convergence clubs. Club 2 contains Galicia, Bukovina
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Table 1.2: Convergence clubs
Clubs

Nr. of units

Members

Beta

T-value

Club 1

11

0.315
(0.183)

1.714

Club 2

3

Lower Austria, Upper Austria,
Moravia, Bohemia, Styria,
Salzburg, Tyrol and Voralberg,
Carniola, Carinthia, Littoral
Bukovina, Dalmatia, Galicia

-0.739
(-0.601)

-1.231

and Dalmatia. Club 1 contains the remaining regions. Figure 1.4 below shows the transition
paths of the two convergence clubs. Group 2 has a lower relative transition path. The transition paths within the clubs are very synchronized. At the same time, the average transition
paths of the two clubs depicted in the bottom graph are highly heterogenous.
Lastly, Figure 1.5 shows the two convergence clubs on the map of the empire. As depicted
on the map, the three regions belonging to convergence club 2 (in dark red shading), i.e. the
club following the lower transition path, are located on the margins of the empire.

1.4.4

Exploring reasons for a lack of convergence

The review of literature has hinted at a number of possible explanations for uneven development in the Habsburg empire. As the results of the convergence club hypothesis have
highlighted, Dalmatia, Bukovina and Galicia were on a lower transition path than the other
regions of the empire. There are a number of factors that scholars have put forward to
explain uneven development in the empire, including institutional impediments, lack of capital access and infrastructure. But can they explain the sub-par economic performance of
members of convergence club 2?

Common geographic and institutional impediments
As the map of the empire in Figure 1.5 underlines, Galicia, Bukovina and Dalmatia shared
the fate of being peripheral to the Austrian empire. In addition, the three regions were
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Figure 1.5: Convergence clubs mapped

Source: Author’s elaboration

far removed from the administrative capital, Vienna, straddling the Hungarian part of the
empire. The regions also had a similar history in terms of being late entries into the Habsburg
lands, becoming part of the empire in the second half of the eighteenth and early nineteenth
century. Both Galicia and Bukovina were in fact Habsburg ”inventions”, i.e. newly defined
geographic units (Judson, 2016).
Galicia come under the royal tutelage of the Habsburg empire in 1772 as a result of the
partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Already on his first visit to the lands in
1773, Joseph - later to be emperor as Joseph II - informed his mother, the empress Maria
Theresia, that ”the work will be immense here” (see Judson, 2016). This was both due to
a lack of institutional capacity and a strong local land-owning elite that was unwilling to
submit to change and risk the loss of established privileges. Scope for reforms was thus
limited. As Judson (2016) notes, it would have been ”extremely difficult to create a new
Galician society without an enormous investment of resources, and that was something the
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Habsburgs - especially budget-cutting Joseph - could not afford.” These factors hampered
economic growth in Galicia throughout the 19th century. As Ciccarelli and Missiaia (2018)
note, economic realities matched ”the proverbial ”Galician poverty.” 3
Bukovina, which became part of the empire in 1775, was an under-populated rural area,
in which Habsburg efforts were particularly centered on encouraging migration into the
region from other parts of the empire. Some have interpreted the status of Bukovina in the
Habsburg empire as similar to that of British and French colonies overseas (see for instance
Grigorovita, 1996). Glajar (2001) notes that the ”Habsburgs had a ”mission civilisatrice”
in the ”barbaric East” (P.15)”, likening it to that of the British and French colonial powers.
Other scholars, such as Judson (2016), have contested the view of a colonial reading of the
history of Bukovina.
Another common factor was the relative poverty of the local elites and rigid feudal relations, which as Judson (2016) highlights stood in stark contrast to the more economically
advanced non-German regions Moravia and Bohemia, where a ”prosperous nobility often took
the initiative to invest its considerable capital to promote economic change” (P. 109). The
local elites also played a key role in either facilitating or hampering Habsburg efforts to levy
and mobilize tax income. As Judson (2016) and others argue, the ability of the imperial
central government to levy taxes on its regions was critical for the fiscal and economic wellbeing of the empire. Difficulties were particularly pronounced when it came to Hungarian
regions, but also extended to the newly acquired regions of Bukovina and Galicia. As data
drawn from the Statistical Yearbooks of the Austrian Empire suggest, per capita tax income
in Lower Austria was around 11 Gulden, while only around 1.5 Gulden in Bukovina and
3

To summarize the economic conditions of Galicia, one can also draw on one of the most celebrated
works of Austrian literature, Joseph Roth’s Radetzky March, which describes the dire conditions in a nameless border-town in Galicia at the turn of the century: ”The tradesmen in those parts lived far more on
happenstance than prospects, far more on unpredictable providence than any commercial planning (..). The
livelihoods of these tradesmen were a riddle. They had no shops. They had no names. They had no credit”
(Joseph Roth, 1933).
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Galicia. Even when accounting for differences in GDP, which was approximately 3.5 times
higher in Lower Austria than in Galicia, the gap in ability to levy taxes remains significant.
As Klein et al. (2017) argue there was also a lack of human capital due to a legacy of decades
of low investment in education.

Availability of capital
The availability of capital, from both public and private sources, may also be a possible
determinant of convergence in some regions and non-convergence in others. One key lender
was the Austrian Central Bank, the Nationalbank. The Nationalbank, founded in 1816, soon
branched out into other areas of the empire. By 1852, the Nationalbank had expanded to
Prague (Bohemia), Brno (Moravia), Opava (Silesia), Linz (Upper Austria) and Graz (Styria),
thus to all the major industrialized regions, which benefitted from an expansion of credit as
catalyst for industrial development, particularly in mining and textile manufacturing. These
industries were heavily concentrated in the Czech regions of Bohemia and Moravia as well
as Lower Austria (Leisse, 2014).
During a further expansion in 1864, twelve additional branches were opened across the
regions of the empire. In 1869, no lending is reported in Bukovina and Dalmatia. Lending
by the Nationalbank in Carniola and Galicia is below the levels in the fast-growing industrial
regions of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, which received in excess of 0.4% of their regional
GDP in capital, as shown in Table 1.3. Yet, by 1875 there was a notable shift towards
expanded lending to Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Galicia, which recorded relative gains in
their share of lending.
This is also reflected in correlations between lending and GDP per capita. In 1869, the
correlation coefficient is 0.76, decreasing to 0.68 in 1875. When excluding Vienna/Lower
Austria from the calculation, to which lending was biased as headquarter of the bank, the
correlation coefficient between lending and GDP per capita is 0.42 in 1869 and falls to 0.05
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Table 1.3: Lending of the Nationalbank in Cisleithania, 1869 and 1875
Branch
Vienna
Linz
Salzburg
Gratz
Klagenfurt
Laibach
Triest
Innsbruck
Prag
Reichenberg
Pilsen
Teplitz
Bruenn
Olmuetz
Troppau
Bielitz
Krakau
Lemberg
Czernowitz

Region
Lower Austria
Upper
Salzburg
Styria
Carinthia
Carniola
Littoral
Tyrol
Bohemia
Bohemia
Bohemia
Bohemia
Moravia
Moravia
Silesia
Silesia
Galicia
Galicia
Bukovina

Lending/Regional GDP
1869
1875
2.96%
0.33%
0.37%
0.68%
0.35%
0.15%
0.36%
0.18%
0.29%
0.12%
0.36%
0.08%
0.51%
0.13%
0.09%
0.27%
-

1.32%
0.16%
0.06%
0.44%
0.26%
0.23%
0.01%
0.01%
0.21%
0.01%
0.02%
0.01%
0.23%
0.07%
0.26%
0.17%
0.09%
0.22%
0.12%

Lending/Total
1869
1875
61.70%
1.67%
0.39%
4.06%
0.53%
0.26%
1.31%
1.03%
10.51%
4.50%
4.56%
1.01%
1.32%
0.34%
1.65%
5.16%
-

55.49%
1.50%
0.11%
5.36%
0.71%
0.67%
0.09%
0.10%
13.24%
0.41%
0.99%
0.34%
5.07%
1.48%
1.40%
0.94%
3.36%
8.32%
0.42%

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch der k. und k. Statistischen Central-Comission (1869)

in 1875, suggesting that lending by the Nationalbank was no longer a determinant of GDP
per capita levels in 1875. Throughout the late 19th century and the turn of the century, the
regional expansion continued apace. Until the early 1910s further branches were added - 22 in
total, particularly in the industrialized areas of Bohemia and Moravia, further strengthening
the outreach of the Austrian Central Bank beyond Vienna. The success of Czech banks
and their significant expansion in the late nineteenth century support this trend (Wakounig,
2020). Overall, these trends suggests that the Nationalbank shifted its attention towards the
non-German regions, yet perhaps with a limited impact in fostering convergence.

Infrastructure
As the review of literature has underlined, railways played a catalytic role for the economic
development of the empire. The five volume history of the Habsburg imperial railways,
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edited by Strach in the late 1890s, provide testament to the importance of railways in the
monarchy. As Strach (1898) notes, the history of railways and of the economic development
of the empire are inextricably linked (Strach, 1898). Indeed, there was”hardly an area of
stately and economic life being untouched” (p.1) by the railways, which ”act as barometer
of the entire economic development” of the empire (p.4). As highlighted in Strach (1898),
railways were particularly important for Austria, being ”a territory blessed only in a limited
way by easily and comfortably navigable waterways” (p.4).
Accordingly, railway construction was an integral part of the empire’s policy starting
in the 1850s, and particularly from 1854 onwards, when private investment in railways was
facilitated through a new concessions system and public guarantees (Freiherr v. Roell, 1912).
Railway construction saw a temporary slump in the aftermath of the 1873 economic crisis,
but reverted back to high levels of investment by the end of the century. Rapid increase in
railways between 1896 and 1906 reflected the increased investment in railway construction
following the establishment of the Ministry of Railways in 1896 (Freiherr v. Roell, 1912).
In 1896, the empire boasted over 16 thousand kilometers of railway. By 1906, the total
length of railways in the Austrian empire was over 21 thousand kilometers. There is a strong
positive correlation between GDP per capita and railways in 1906, suggesting that a lack of
investment in transport links may have contributed to the lack of convergence in Dalmatia,
Bukovina and Galicia.
It is also of interest to consider the sources of financing. Private financing played an
increasingly important role in railway investment during the second half of the nineteenth
century, catalyzed through a new concessions system and public guarantees (Freiherr v.
Roell, 1912). Table 1.4 below shows the breakdown of railways by private and public financing in 1906.
As table 1.4 suggests, the share of private railways as a percentage of total is heavily
skewed towards the members of convergence club 1. The three regions of convergence club
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Table 1.4: Private railways by region (km) in 1906
Region
Lower Austria
Upper Austria
Salzburg
Styria
Carinthia
Carniola
Littoral
Tyrol
Bohemia
Moravia
Silesia
Galicia
Bukovina
Dalmatia

Public
1223646
915449
290827
650848
375648
292180
444125
503112
3441908
1281174
529030
3898900
534780
228959

Private
1070869
71980
116955
763537
207210
180020
130099
534311
3030860
708433
70690
0
0
0

Private/Total
47%
7%
29%
54%
36%
38%
23%
52%
47%
36%
12%
0%
0%
0%

2, i.e. Galicia, Bukovina and Dalmatia, did not receive any private railway investment,
as recorded by the K.K Eisenbahnministerium. Lower Austria, Styria, Tyrol and Bohemia
on the the other hand had close to half of its railways financed from private sources. The
correlation between GDP and the share of private railways/total railways in 1906 is high at
0.63. Overall, the regions with the highest GDP per capita largely coincide with those with
the highest rates of railway concentration and private investment.
Scholars have also put forward a number of additional reasons for a lack of catch-up
of poorer Habsburg regions, including uneven productivity growth (see e.g. Schulze, 2007)
and economic nationalism (see e.g. Schulze and Wolf, 2012). There is scope for further
comparative research to explore whether these factors can explain a lack of convergence of
Bukovina, Galicia and Dalmatia specifically.

1.4.5

The curious case of Carniola

Carniola represents an interesting case, having less than 300 Kronen of per capita income in
the 1860s und thus close to the three poorest regions, but managing to catch up with the
other regions and being a member of convergence club 1.
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Before letting the numbers speak, it should be noted that many contemporaries would
have likely not agreed with the assertion that Carniola represented a poster-child of economic
development and convergence within the empire. In the morning session of the Imperial
House of Representatives of 22 May 1901, Representative Progacnik of Carniola delivered a
statement maintaining that ”the investments, which, akin to a spring rain, should bring to
blossom the Austrian economy, have only been a drizzle in my own homeland of Carniola”
(Oesterreichischer Reichsrat - Abgeordnetenhaus, 1901). He also stated that the region had
been neglected and that investments in a Trans-Carniola railway would only act as a passthrough for transit to Trieste, the empire’s principle harbor, located in neighboring Littoral
(ibid).4 In the very same session Representative Zitnik, also of Carniola, lamented the limited
availability of capital for investment in industrial development in Carniola.
Were Representatives Progacnik and Zitnik right in their assessment? While economic
data for the region is limited for the time-frame under consideration, there are a few aspects,
which may have contributed to the positive economic performance, particularly relative to
the three poorest regions. One is indeed the region’s favorable transport linkages. Despite
the negative assessment of the region’s two Representatives, the rail link as well as the
vicinity to Trieste, put Carniola in a more privileged geographic location than other regions.
Indeed, the railway built between Vienna and Trieste, one of the first in the region, connected
Ljubljana to these two centers of economic activity as early as 1849 (Toepfer, 2011).
As Toepfer (2011) notes, these rail links may have acted as both a blessing and a curse
for the region. On one hand, it fueled demand for raw materials, much of which could
be produced in Carniola’s mines, including coal, as well as allowing for the export of wool
products, including weaved products, which were manufactured within the region. On the
4

Representative Progacnik also aroused ”amusement” (according to official transcripts) in the House by
claiming that the railway was only constructed through the region because, due to a lack of development
of air travel, the region of Carniola could not simply be flown over by plane to reach Trieste - which is a
curious statement given that this was the year 1901 and thus two years before the Wright brothers would
take flight.
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other hand, it impeded development of other sectors, as the cost of importing goods from
either Vienna or Trieste was relatively low. The second driver of economic growth and
thus convergence may have been the already mentioned mining sector, which, while not as
prominent as minig sectors of Bohemia and Moravia, may have nonetheless contributed to
the economic performance of Carniola.
Another factor was very low population growth. Indeed, Carniola had the lowest increase
in population of all regions in the empire between 1867 and 1913. During the time-frame
the population only grew by 15%, while it grew by about 50% in Dalmatia, Bukovina and
Galicia and almost doubled in Lower Austria. The low rate of population growth can largely
be traced to emigration, particularly from poorer rural areas in Carniola, to other parts of the
empire (including Vienna and Trieste) a well as to other countries. There was a significant
emigration to the United States, with estimates suggesting that between 170 thousand to 300
thousand inhabitants of what is present-day Slovenia moved to the United States between
1860 and 1914 (Luthar, 2008), which is a large number for a region with only a little more
than 460 thousand inhabitants in 1867. This suggests that GDP per capita was bolstered
by large-scale emigration and low population growth.

1.5

The long view on Habsburg convergence, 18702018

1.5.1

Expanding the data

To look beyond the empire and enable a long-term view on the empire’s legacy, continuous
estimates of GDP per capita for the regions of the Habsburgian empire are needed. Given
the historical upheavals that the European continent faced in the 20th century, there has
been no geographical (and thus statistical) continuity. Individual regions of the empire are
spread across different present-day countries, including Italy, Poland, Slovenia, Ukraine, and
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Romania.
In order to generate current regional GDP per capita estimates for the historical regions
of the Habsburg empire beyond 1918, GIS software can be used to map historical regions in
present-day projections. The underlying geographic and spatial data for present-day regions
are based on the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). Specifically, NUTS
3 level data, which represent the smallest units available, are used as reference data. On the
basis of maps of the Habsburg empire, such as the one depicted below, NUTS 3 regions are
aggregated and reshaped to recreate new regions that represent projections of the historical
regions.
In cases in which individual NUTS 3 region is spread across borders of historical regions, it
is split according to the share of its geographical area that is overlapping with the respective
historical regions. One concrete example is the region of Vysocina in present-day Czech
Republic, which overlaps by 48% with historical Bohemia and 52% with Moravia, according
to the GIS projections. GDP data for Vysocina is attributed to the two historical regions
according to these shares. A complete overview of the NUTS 3 regions contained within
boundaries of the historical regions is listed in the annex.
The advantage of using this approach is that a significant number of historical regions
can be linked to contemporary geographical units for which present-day data is available
and thus enable the calculation of present-day GDP data for historical regions. Exceptions
are parts of Bukovina and Galicia as well as Croatia-Slavonia, which are located in present
day Ukraine and Serbia, respectively, for which no NUTS 3 level data is available. In these
cases, regions are mapped on the basis of available regions only.
A possible drawback of using a geographical mapping approach is that it does not take
into account population density within the NUTS 3 regions, which may lead to inaccuracies,
if the distribution of the population and economic activity is particularly skewed to one part
of the region. Given the small overall size of the regions and the fact that most regions are
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Figure 1.6: Map of the Austro-Hungarian empire

Source: Freytag and Bernd

comprised of several and up to 15 NUTS 3 regions, it is unlikely to have a significant effect
on the overall projections. As NUTS 3 GDP per capita data are reported in terms of current
prices, the series is deflated using OECD GDP deflator data for most and CPI indices for
Croatian and Romanian regions, for which the former data is unavailable. GDP per capita
data are deflated at the NUTS 3 level using national GDP deflator and CPI data, thus not
accounting for differences in prices within countries.
On the basis of historical data and the newly-generated contemporary data, three distinct
time-frames can be analyzed. The first is the latter part of the 19th and early 20th century,
i.e. the Habsburg era, which is covered in the preceding chapter for the period 1870 to 1910.
The second time-frame is the contemporary period from 2000 to 2018, which can be analyzed
on the basis of the newly-generated GDP per capita estimates from NUTS 3 data. Lastly,
the time period between 1910 and 2000 can be studied by looking at the relative GDP per
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capita levels of regions in 1910 and comparing them to the relative levels in 2000. This
section will show the results of convergence analysis across these two latter time-frames.

1.5.2

The 20th century: 1910-2000

Figure 1.7 depicts the 1910 to 2000 time-frame. This time period covers a tumultuous period
of the history of Central and Eastern Europe, including World War I and World War II as
well as the rise and fall of communist rule in a significant part of the Habsburg regions. The
time period also covers the decade following the demise of Communism and the aftermath
of the breakup of Yugoslavia, affecting a number of former Habsburg regions.
This tumultuous history is reflected in the convergence relation depicted in Figure 1.8.
Nine regions, including all but one former Hungarian-ruled region, are located in the redshaded quadrant. All regions in present day Austria are in the light green quadrant, suggesting high initial levels and high growth. Carniola, which covers parts of present day Slovenia,
acts as an outlier and interesting case for possible further study.

1.5.3

Converging into the EU: 2000-2018

The 2000s saw a number of countries join the European Union. Figure 1.9 below depicts the
relationship between GDP per capita and annualized growth for the same regions between
2000 and 2018.
The chart suggests that the hypothesis of convergence holds within the contemporary
context, characterized by the existence of a supra-national entity, i.e. the European Union,
which a large part of the formerly Habsburg regions joined by 2004. In this context, convergence has likely been fueled by the opportunities of gaining access to the common EU
market as well as spending from the European cohesion funds, which represent a specifically
designed regional policy tool to favor catch-up growth of poorer regions.
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Figure 1.7: Convergence, 1910-2000

Table 1.5: Convergence, 2000-2018
Regions

Beta

Intercept

t-value

R-squared

N

All Habsburg regions

-2.4719**
(0.9167)

12.1238***
(3.7214)

-2.697

0.2666

22

Habsburg regions
(Ex. Bukovina)

-3.2155***
(0.7951)

15.3137***
(3.2441)

-4.044

0.4624

21

Transleithania

-4.907
(4.131)

21.423
(15.798)

-1.188

0.167

8

Cisleithania

-2.288*
(1.065)

11.364**
(4.456)

-2.149

0.2778

14

-3.8738***
(0.6917)

18.3036***
(2.9230)

-5.600

0.7404

13

Cisleithania
(Ex. Bukovina)
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Figure 1.8: Relative convergence (100=Average), 1910-2000

Source: Author’s elaboration

The major difference to the Habsburg era, is that convergence is exhibited across most
regions, including Galicia and Dalmatia, which failed to converge during the imperial era.
The only outlier is the data point for Bukovina, which, due to a lack of data availability
for Ukrainian regions, only covers a small part and may thus not be representative of the
historical region. Figure 1.10 depicts convergence on the basis of relative GDP per capita
and supports the above findings of across-the-board convergence. Between 2000-2018 there
was strong evidence of convergence across the whole set of regions. Can the conclusion
be drawn from the preceding analysis that the time-frame between 2000 and 2018 was the
most ”successful” period in terms of convergence? The answer is more ambiguous than the
preceding figures may suggest.
Taking a closer look at the relative GDP per capita levels and comparing the year 1870 to
2018 reveals another striking result: Despite the convergence spurt over the past two decades,
13 of the 16 regions not largely located in present-day Austria have seen their relative GDP
per capita levels deteriorate between 1870 and 2018. Figure 1.11 shows the comparison of
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Figure 1.9: Convergence across Habsburgian regions, 2000-2018

Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of NUTS 3 data
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Figure 1.10: Relative Growth (100=Average), 2000-2018

Source: Author’s elaboration

relative GDP per capita levels between 1870 and 2018. The left bar for each respective region
depicts relative GDP per capita in 1870, the right bar in 2018, with the green (red) coloring
indicating an increase (decrease) relative to the position in 1870. Indeed, some regions are
today significantly below their relative 1870 levels.
These findings suggests that despite notable catch-up since 2000, many of the former
Habsburg regions in the North, East and South of the empire have yet to make up lost
ground since the end of imperial rule. Figure 1.12 below shows the unweighted Gini and
Figure 1.13 the Type II Gini for Habsburg regions across time. The figure underlines that
regional inequality today is much higher today in the ’EU period’ than it was during the
Habsburg era. Figure 1.14 shows the Gini II for Cisleithania and Transleithania.

1.5.4

No long-term convergence in sight

The last remaining question is whether there is evidence of convergence over the entire
1870-2018 time-frame under review, which can add to the rich body of work on convergence
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Figure 1.11: Relative GDP per capita: 1870 versus 2018

Source: Author’s elaboration
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Figure 1.12: Unweighted Gini, 1870-2018

Note: Year of EU accession differed, Source: Author’s elaboration

Figure 1.13: Type II Gini, 1870-2018

Note: Year of EU accession differed, Source: Author’s elaboration
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Figure 1.14: Type II Gini, 1870-2018

Note: Year of EU accession differed, Source: Author’s elaboration

pioneered by Barro and Sala-i-Martin. As shown in Figure 1.15, there is no evidence of
convergence over the entire time-frame of analysis. The linear regression line is upward
sloping and insignificant. Overall, the results do not yield support to the hypothesis of
natural convergence and a catch-up of poorer to richer regions irrespective of the policy
environment. On the contrary, it supports the view that regional economic policy can favor
convergence, as was the case during the 2000-2018 time-frame and for a majority of regions
between 1870-1910.
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Figure 1.15: Convergence (or lack thereof), 1870-2018

Source: Author’s elaboration
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Concluding remarks

”The heart of Austria is not the centre, but the periphery. You won’t find Austria in the Alps
- chamois, yes, and edelweiss and gentians but barely a hint of the double-headed eagle. The
substance of Austria is drawn and replenished from the Crown Lands.” Joseph Roth (1938),
The Emperor’s Tomb
The preceding analysis of regional disparities in the Habsburg regions in this study has
revealed a number of findings. First, there is evidence of convergence across a large number
of regions during the Habsburg era, with the exceptions of Dalmatia, Galicia and Bukovina.
The analysis of convergence clubs supports the notion that these latter three regions were
on a lower transition path than members of convergence club 1. This finding suggests that
there was no general divergence within the empire, but that only three regions were locked
out of the overall economic growth of the empire. The notion that growing regional economic
disparities fostered the empire’s eventual demise are thus not supported by these findings.
Instead, this study shows that only three regions on the very periphery of the empire failed to
converge. In addition to their unfavorable geographic location within the empire, the three
regions shared a number of characteristics, including low (private) investment in railroads,
institutional weakness related to their late entry into the empire and unsupportive elites.
These factors point to an inability in these regions to foster investment and take advantage
of forward and backward linkages to spur economic development. Indeed, the case study
of the successful convergence of Carniola suggests that the region, thanks to its favorable
geographic position, was able to benefit from the existence of forward and backward linkages
fostered by railroad investment.
Second, the long-term view of regional disparities in the Habsburg regions in this study
provides evidence of significant divergence in regions for the period between 1914 and 2000.
With the notable exception of Carniola, all countries under communist rule saw their relative

CHAPTER 1. CONVERGENCE IN HABSBURG REGIONS, 1870-2018

40

position compared to Habsburg peers deteriorate markedly during the time-frame under
review.
Third, the paper finds high levels of regional disparities in today’s context of the European
Union compared to the Habsburg era, despite rapid catch-up over the past two decades,
which saw convergence across the regions of the former Habsburg empire. The evidence
on convergence since 2000 suggests that integration into the European market and direct
support through European cohesion funds have been successful in fueling catch-up growth,
but that significant disparities remain. Comparing levels of regional inequality suggests that,
as of 2018, former Habsburg regions were more equal under Habsburg rule than they have
been ever since. This finding should provide further impetus to advance regional cohesion
policy in support of regional economic development of EU regions.
Lastly, this study finds no evidence of convergence over the entire 1870-2018 time-frame
under review, adding to a number of studies finding no evidence of unconditional convergence
using the Barro and Sala-i-Martin methodology.

Chapter 2
Income inequality and unification in
19th century
”I think that my patriotism (...) does not prevent me from admitting that we can in some
aspects take a fruitful example of Italy (..) which in more than one aspect has taken some
steps ahead of us in the past decades”, German Assemblyman von Sybel, 1862.1
”Another takeaway from The Honorable Lucca, which reflects the entire tenor of his
statement, is the following: In Italy we are doing badly, in Germany it is going very well!”,
Italian Representative Ferraris, 1886.2

2.1

Introduction

As noted by Ziblatt (2004), ”a comparison of nineteenth century Germany and Italy offers a
promising opportunity for theory development” (P. 71). Yet, despite the shared experiences
1

From the proceeds of the Prussian House of Representatives: Stenographische Berichte ueber die Verhandlungen des Preussischen Hauses der Abgeordneten, 14th session of 25 June 1862.
2
From the proceeds of the Italian House of Representatives: Atti Parlamentari - Camera dei Deputati,
16th legislature, Session 1a of 26 November 1886
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and the mutual awareness of the unification experience highlighted in the above quotes from
Germany and Italy, the two cases have seldom been studied in tandem.3 This research will
analyze possible changes in the distribution of income in Italy and Germany in response
to unification and related policy actions in 1861 and 1871, respectively. Specifically, this
research will seek to analyze how the unification process and ensuing policy choices may
have lead to changes in income inequality as well as inequality extraction from the ”core”,
i.e. Piedmont and Prussia, versus the ”periphery”, i.e. Southern Italy and South and SouthWest Germany.
As is the case for a majority of studies of inequality in a historical setting, there is very
limited and sometimes no available data to accurately study changes in the distribution of
income over time. While some data is available for pre- and post-unification Italy, there is
a significant data gap for German states in the mid-19th century prior to unification. This
study will seek to close this gap by compiling data for pre-unification Germany on the basis
of social tables for Bavaria and Prussia, thereby contributing to the comparative literature
on historical global inequality and particularly on inequality extraction ratios, as advanced
in the work of Milanovic (2009).
Despite its historical background, this study is geared to be relevant for the inequality
literature and for public policy beyond the immediate unification experience of Germany
and Italy. By examining effects of changes in inequality extraction among regions and its
impact on inequality at the national level, this study can also be relevant for policy makers
and scholars with an interest in drivers of inequality and regional economic policy.
3

With the notable exception of the work of Ziblatt (2004), which studies the respective experiences with
regards to a federal versus unitary state system.
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Unsteady states: The political economy of 19th
century unification

Italy and Germany before unification consisted of a fragmented map of states, which was
drawn in the late 18th and early 19th century, most notably as a result of the Vienna
Peace Congress of 1815 (Ziblatt, 2004). Despite political fragmentation, the states were
economically intertwined, especially in Germany, where the custom union, the so-called
Zollverein, fostered economic integration.
There is an ongoing scholarly debate on the origins of the North-South divide in Italy
and whether it predates the unification of Italy. While the traditional view has traced the
origins of the divide to before unification and as far back as to medieval times, a more recent
strand of research has argued that the North and South were largely on par in the mid-19th
century (see Federico, 2007 as well as Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea, 2013). Indeed as Oliviera
and Guerriero (2018) argue, the ”present-day divide is also due to the region-specific policies
selected between 1861 and 1911 by the elite of the Kingdom of Sardinia, which unified Italy
in 1861”.
As noted at the outset, there are several important parallels between the Italian and
German national experiment. One of them is an initial endorsement of federalism. As noted
by Ziblatt (2004), Cavour, considered a lead architect of a unified Italy, was highly committed
to the idea of a federalist state with a strong role for local governance (Ziblatt, 2004). Yet,
despite the initial commitment to federalism, the push for unification from the core states
led to conflict with peripheral states, and ultimately to unitary governance structures.
As noted by Ziblatt (2004) and others, the rise of Prussia led to violent resistance by
Southern German states in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, in which Bavaria fought alongside Austria against Prussia. The process of Italian unification is also marked by violence in
rural areas of the South, commonly referred to as brigantaggio. Cayli (2017) notes the origins
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of the brigantaggio as rooted in the discontent over a lack of social justice in the governance
of rural areas and limited progress on social and agricultural reforms in the South. Cayli
(2017) also argues that the unrest was tackled through a suppressive authority-centered state
intervention.
The Austro-Prussian war of 1866 also provides an interesting insight into the interplay
between domestic and foreign policy. As argued by Wawro (1995) there is evidence that,
above all, the Austro-Prussian war was motivated by a desire of Prussian elites to galvanize public opinion behind a war effort. Wehler (1973) argues that Bismarck’s overarching
objective in unifying Germany was to perpetuate the privileged position of Prussian elites
against the rising tide of the urban bourgeoisie. The war of 1866 also provides another interesting parallel to the Italian unification experience, as the Italian unification experience also
critically depended on conflict with the Habsburg empire and on rallying national sentiment
behind a war against Austria, albeit in the early days of the unified Italy. As Wawro (1995)
notes, pushing back left-leaning political forces and galvanizing the populace was one of the
driving forces behind the decision of Vittoria Emmanuelle II to declare war on Austria in
1866.
The war effort did not only fulfill domestic political objectives, but also played an important role in building capacity for the fiscal state (see e.g. Mares and Queralt, 2015),
highlighting the important linkages between unification and the rise of the fiscal state. Indeed, fiscal expansion acted as driving factor for the national experiment of unification. As
Ziblatt (2004) argues, unification was advanced due to the desire of Prussian and Piedmontese governing elites to ”expand territorial control with the aim of securing greater fiscal
resources, more manpower, and more territory - all the hallmarks of ”great power” status”
(Ziblatt, 2004, P. 73).
Overall, the unification of Italy and Germany provides a useful context to study the
effects of policy and institutional change on inequality, as it represented a drastic change
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in institutional and policy frameworks, while keeping other variables, such as structural
economic, demographic and external factors constant over the short-term. Indeed, other
paradigm shifts such as the sharp acceleration in industrialization as well as the rise of
socialist parties, which may have tempered rises in inequality, only fully materialized more
than a decade after unification in Germany, specifically in the mid to late 1890s4 .

2.3

Theoretical framework

The preceding analysis of historical similarities of the national experiments in Italy and
Germany can provide useful pointers to the study of unification as natural experiment and
its impacts on inequality. As mentioned, one of the parallels in the unification experience
was the aim to secure greater fiscal resources. The consequent fiscal policy of the new state
is likely to have had a marked impact on the distribution of income in the two newly-formed
nations. This section will explore this and other avenues through which unification and its
aftermath may have altered the distribution of income within the two nations as well as
between core and peripheral regions.

2.3.1

Regional integration

One field of literature that emphasizes the positive effects of unification and greater economic
and political integration, particularly in the context of the European Union, is the scholarship
on economic integration. There is a rich body of work on regional convergence, including in
the context of the European Union (see for instance Dunford, 1994 or Busemeyer and Tober,
2015). This literature suggests that due to greater economic and political integration, which
may facilitate free trade and factor mobility, less-developed areas should grow faster than
4
For instance, as argued by Bartels et al. (2021) vote shares of the SPD, the socialist party, were less
than 10% in the 1870s and 1880s.
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more-developed ones, as the latter would face declining returns to capital investment, which
would unlock capital flows to less-developed regions.
Moreover, unification would favor the diffusion of technology across regions, raising the
technology levels of the less-developed areas. Overall, political integration should thus bring
economic convergence between regions. There is little evidence that this was the case in
either Italy or Germany. The rich body of literature on the North-South divide in Italy
documents the opposite, i.e. a lack of convergence between the regions of the North and the
South of Italy following unification.
As mentioned in the preceding section, there has been an interesting shift in the scholarship on the North-South divide over the past years. While earlier studies pointed to
pre-unification roots of the divide, recent scholarship on wages (Daniele and Malanima,
2017) point to a divergence in the latter part of the 19th century, arguing that conditions
in the early days of the Italian Kingdom were largely homogenous across regions and that
a divergence between the regions only gained steam in unified Italy. In Germany, regional
integration was largely incomplete before WWI, as Germany continued to be characterized
by a fragmentation of trade and resource endowments (see Wolf, 2009). The literature on
regional integration is thus not well placed to provide insights into changes in the distribution
of income in response to unification.

2.3.2

Unification and federalism

Another starting point is the literature on federalism (see for instance Riker, 1964 and Ziblatt,
2004). Studies on federalism, such as the two aforementioned, commonly see unification and
state building as driven by a desire to increase public goods, such as a national trading
system and security as well as fiscal expansion. State-building may either lead to a federal
state, i.e. a state in which regions retain a certain degree of autonomy, or a unitary state
with strongly concentrated political control. Yet, there has been a recent paradigm shift
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in the study of federalism and its origins. According to earlier work by Riker (1964) and
others, a militarily stronger state is expected to annex smaller states to increase market size
and territorial and population size. The stronger state may chose to seek a unitary state
by force or the threat of force, if their military power is sufficiently superior. Instead, if the
state is not sufficiently powerful or may have ideological qualms, it may be more inclined to
give concessions and thus agree to a more federal system.
As one of very few studies that analyze the experiences of Italy and Germany jointly,
Ziblatt (2004) argues that the unification of the two states does not follow this line of
reasoning. Despite the fact that Prussia accounted for 57% of the population and 54% of
its public spending and territorial size, the unified German nation followed a federal model.
Piedmont on the other hand, had only 6% of the population, 29% of its military and 22% of
the territory of the unified Italian state. Nonetheless, Italy adopted a unitary model (Ziblatt,
2004).
To explain the cases of Italy and Germany, Ziblatt (2004) proposes an infrastructural
model of federalism that moves beyond military power, arguing that states are formed and/or
unified on the basis of the interplay between coercion and compromise. Ziblatt states that
federalism is possible if existing states are ”highly institutionalized”, as only states with a
high degree of institutional capacity are able to deliver on the promises of state building,
i.e. greater national security and an efficient fiscal state. Ziblatt (2004) argues that German
regions had higher levels of institutional capacity, which enabled a federal model, as desired
by German elites. Italian regions, on the other hand, were not endowed with institutions
that would allow for a federal approach, despite the desire of the pioneers of the Risorgimento
to pursue such a model. In referring to the ”sporadic rule” (P. 84) of the Kingdom of the
Two Sicilies over its territories, Ziblatt (2004) cites a number of factors that contributed to
this lack of institutional capacity, including a lack of efficient taxation. Indeed, according to
Ziblatt (2004), the extractive capacity in terms of a state’s fiscal revenue per capita between
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1850-1860 was over 32 lire in Piedmont, while only between 14 and 15 lire in the Two Sicilies
and the Papal States.
Whether a state is unitary or federal matters for the study of inequality in so far as it
changes the concentration of power. In a unitary state model, power is highly concentrated,
while in a federal model power and thus policy decision making is more fragmented.

2.3.3

Unification and extractive institutions

The afore-mentioned reference to extractive capacity and concentration of powers opens
up additional pathways for inquiry into the effects of unification on inequality. If indeed
the choice of federal or unitary state matters in terms of the concentration of power and
institutional capacity for extractive taxation, then such a policy choice and the structure of
existing and newly established institutional frameworks may also impact the distribution of
income in a newly unified state.
There is a rich body of literature on extractive institutions (see for instance Engerman
and Sokoloff, 2000). Engerman and Sokoloff, in analyzing the institutions of Latin America
in the 16th to 18th centuries (2000), argue that the stability of an entrenched elite can
have disproportionate political influence and shape institutions. Such institutions ”protected
the privileges of the elites and restricted opportunities for the broad mass of the population”
(P. 221). In high inequality settings, elites can set institutional and legal frameworks that
give them outsized power to shape laws and policies that further entrench and perpetuate
inequality.
A small number of studies analyze extractive institutions in the context of unification
of Germany as well as Italy, for instance the work of Oliveira and Guerriero (2018) for
Italy and Mares and Queralt (2015) for the case of income taxation in Prussia. Oliveira
and Guerriero (2018) propose a theoretical framework to analyze the extractive power and
effects of extractive policies on the origins of the present-day North South divide in Italy.
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With regards to the effects on industrialization in Italy, they find no tangible impact of
extraction on industrialization and more broadly economic development, arguing thus that
extraction”cannot be considered the acceptable price for the Italian development (pp.158).”

2.3.4

Inequality extraction

To link considerations of extractive institutions to inequality, inequality extraction ratios
(IERs) are ideally placed to facilitate the analysis, combining both concepts, inequality and
extractive power of elites, within one indicator that is based on the Gini coefficient. As
noted by Milanovic (2013), IERs allow for an analysis of extractive/inequality-generating
institutions, which is exactly the type of institutions one would expect to find in a postunification context, characterized by newly concentrated power within a regional elite. As
Milanovic (2013) notes, ”the inequality extraction ratio, by capturing how close to the frontier
is actual inequality, conveys the information about the relative ’rapaciousness’ of the elite”
(pp. 17).
Inequality extraction ratios build on the Inequality Possibility Frontier (IPF) (Milanovic
et al., 2010). The IPF is based on the notion that 1 is not necessarily a feasible maximum
Gini, as a realistic lower bound for income in a society is a subsistence minimum, which
ensures survival of the poorest share of the population. On the basis of the subsistence
minimum, the maximum feasible Gini coefficient can be calculated, assuming that all people
live at the subsistence level, except for one individual who controls all remaining resources.
The IPF can be derived as follows (see Milanovic et al., 2010):

yh =

1
µN − sN (1 − ε)
= [µ − s(1 − ε)]
εN
ε

(2.1)

where yh denotes the mean income of people in the upper class, s the subsistence minimum,
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µ overall mean income, N the total number of people and, lastly, ε the share of people
belonging to the upper class.
Once this is established for the respective classes within a society, the Gini coefficient
can then be defined as:

G=

n
X

n

Gi pi πi +

i=1

n

1 XX
(yj − yi )pi pj
µ i j>i

(2.2)

with social classes’ mean incomes ordered, as is customary, in an ascending order, with πi
denoting the proportion of income that is made by a given social class, and pi the share
of this respective social class in the population. This formulation assumes that there is no
overlap between social classes, i.e. that social classes are well defined.
For a case with two distinct social classes, a lower and an upper class, this can be
simplified to:
n

n

1 XX
G=
(yj − yi )pi pj
µ i j>i

(2.3)

On the basis of this simplification, the income of the upper class and the respective population
shares can be substituted to derive G∗ , the maximum feasible Gini:

G∗ (µ) =

1 1
{ [µ − s(1 − ε)] − s}ε(1 − ε)
µ ε

(2.4)

In line with Milanovic et al., the subsistence minimum can be rewritten as µ = αs, where α
denotes the mean income in terms of subsistence. The maximum feasible Gini can thus be
written as:

G∗ (µ) =

1−ε
α−1
s(α − 1) =
(1 − ε)
αs
α

(2.5)
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The last step is to analyze the effect of the elite tending towards zero, as mentioned above. If
indeed there is only one individual that extracts all income, except for the level of subsistence
minimum that ensures survival of the population, then G∗ can simply be expressed as:

G∗ (µ) =

α−1
α

(2.6)

On the basis of this maximum feasible Gini coefficient, the inequality extraction ratio can
be calculated as the actual observed Gini divided by the maximum feasible Gini (Milanovic
et al., 2010). In the context of this study, changes in pre-unification to post-unification
inequality extraction ratios can shed light on the impact of unification on inequality and
inequality extraction.

2.3.5

The missing link: From higher extraction to higher overall
inequality in the unification context

The above three subsections have outlined the driving factors for unification and identified
greater taxation and thus, by extension, extraction from peripheral regions as key explanatory factor, thereby outlining a possible transmission channel for increased inequality. But
how does this transition mechanism work? How do we get from higher taxation and extraction to higher overall inequality? This is the very question this subsection will seek to
address.
As mentioned in the preceding subsections in line with the work of Ziblatt (2004) and
others, unification can be driven by a desire to broaden the tax base and tax previously
un- or under-taxed regions. So what happens if a higher-taxed state entity is unified with a
lower-taxed entity?
The question can be answered through a simple schematic model of two independent
states. For the purpose of this study, these two states will be referred to as Corelandia and
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Table 2.1: A simple model of unification and inequality: Pre-unification
Corelandia

Peripheria
Income

Share

Group 1C
Group 2C
Group 3C

100
400
800

0.6
0.3
0.1

Per capita Income

260

260

0.4154

0.3584

Gini

Group 1P
Group 2P
Group 3P

Income

Share

120
400
700

0.603
0.3
0.097

Peripheria. In both states, we have a simple society, with three social groups, which have
low, medium and high incomes, respectively. The below table depicts a numerical example
for the status quo before unification.
There are a number of assumptions that are underlying the above table. First, it is
assumed that Peripheria has a slightly more equal distribution of income, which is reflected
in a lower Gini coefficient of 0.3584, compared to a Gini coefficient of 0.4154 for Corelandia.
This is one of the core assumptions of the model that will need to be analyzed for the
specific cases of Germany and Italy. The second assumption is that per capita income in
the two states is the same. The third assumption is that the two states have a distribution
of incomes that is characterized by a declining share of the population for higher incomes.
In other words, the social class with low income is larger than the social class with medium
incomes, which in turn is larger than the social class with high incomes.
Based on the preceding analysis of inequality extraction ratios, it is also evident from this
table that Corelandia has a higher inequality extraction ratio than Peripheria, given that the
former has a higher Gini and both have the same level of per capita income. For instance,
if the subsistence minimum is 100 units, then the inequality extraction ratio in Corelandia
would be 67.5% in Corelandia and 58.2% in Peripheria. The inequality extraction ratio is
higher for Corelandia than Peripheria for all levels of the subsistence minimum between 0
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Table 2.2: A simple model: Unification without extraction
Unificadia

Group
Group
Group
Group
Group

1C
1P
2C and 2P
3C
3P

Per capita Income
Gini

Income

Share

100
120
400
700
800

0.3
0.302
0.3
0.048
0.05

260
0.3948

and mean income.
The next step of the model is to unify Corelandia and Peripheria into the combined state
of Unificadia. To study the effect of an unequal unification that extracts from the peripheral
states, there is a need to look at two different scenarios. First, a unified state, in which the
periphery is not taxed. The effect of unification can be seen in the below table. To calculate
the population shares, it is assumed that the two states have populations of the same size.
The above table shows a number of interesting results. First, as could have been expected,
the Gini coefficient for Unificadia is lower than the Gini of Corelandia and higher than in
Peripheria. It is important to note, however, that it is not a weighted average of the two. In
this case the Gini of Unificadia is 0.395, which is higher than a hypothetical weighted average
of the Gini coefficients of pre-unification Corelandia and Peripheria, which would be 0.387.
The finding that the combined Gini is not a weighted average carries relevance for studies
that seek to calculate the Gini of a larger unit by calculating the weighted average of the
contained smaller units. This latter approach would lead to inaccuracies in the estimation
of the overall Gini.
The above scenario shows the impact of unification on inequality in the absence of greater
extraction from Peripheria. What would the model predict in a setting where there is greater
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Table 2.3: A simple model: Unification with extraction (10% tax on Peripheria)
Unificadia

Group
Group
Group
Group
Group
Group

1P
1C
2P
2C
3C
3P

Per capita Income
Gini

Income

Share

108
112.069
360
440
630
867.585

0.302
0.3
0.15
0.15
0.048
0.05

260
0.4134

extraction from the periphery? Table 2.3 provides some evidence. The assumption underlying this table is that a 10% tax is levied on incomes in Peripheria, following unification. This
could either be through an outright increase in taxes (including through a mere harmonization of taxation across the Kingdom, assuming the tax burden was lower before unification)
or be levied through other equivalent channels, such as through an unfavorable monetary
union, which devalues incomes in the periphery. In the context of the simple model, it is
assumed that the receipts of the tax are redistributed to the respective social group in Corelandia. This redistribution may happen through a number of indirect channels, for instance
if the proceeds of the taxation benefit the core rather than the periphery, such as through
industrial development and infrastructure investment in the core. The assumption that a
redistribution may benefit the respective equivalent social group in Corelandia is a conservative assumption, as in the context of early industrialization it may well be the case that
high-income groups benefit disproportionally from the public investment that is financed
through greater public spending.
As Table 2.3 shows, the Gini coefficient for Unificadia as a whole increases when a tax
is levied on the social groups of Peripheria and redistributed to the comparable group in
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Table 2.4: Impact of unification on inequality
Pre-unified states
Without redistribution
(1) If G1 <G2
(2) If G2 <G1

Unified state

then G1 <G*U <G2
then G2 <G*U <G1

With regressive or ”class-neutral” redistribution to State1
(3) If G1 <G2
(4) If G2 <G1

GU
then GU >G*U

With regressive or ”class-neutral” redistribution to State2
(5) If G1 <G2
(6) If G2 <G1

then GU >G*U
GU

With progressive redistribution to State1
(7) If G1 <G2
(8) If G2 <G1

GU
GU

With progressive redistribution to State2
(9) If G1 <G2
(10) If G2 <G1

GU
GU

Corelandia. This is a relevant result, as it shows that inequality rises even when redistribution
is ”class-neutral”, i.e. benefits an equivalent social class. Under a regressive tax system or
under a scenario in which the high-income class receives a larger than proportionate share of
the redistribution, the increase in inequality would be even larger. Once again, the relative
higher Gini in the extraction compared to the non-extraction scenario is also reflected in a
higher inequality extraction ratio.
Assuming that the subsistence minimum is 100 units, the inequality extraction ratios
for the extraction versus the non-extraction scenario are 64.1% and 67.2%, respectively. In
other words, in the scenario in which 10% of income is extracted from the periphery, the
inequality extraction ratio will rise for the newly unified state as a whole, assuming that
inequality in the periphery was lower than in the core before unification.
The model can be generalized beyond this case in which a lower inequality and higher
inequality entity are unified. Table 2.4 above shows the dynamics for different scenarios.
As the table indicates, under most scenarios, the Gini coefficient, GU , will depend on the
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income distribution and the size of redistribution, not allowing for an a-priori analysis of
the impact of unification on the Gini coefficient. Under scenarios (4) and (5), however, such
an analysis is possible, suggesting that the Gini, GU , will be higher than the Gini under the
non-redistribution scenario, G∗U . As in the previous example, entities are assumed to have
the same level of mean income. The succeeding analysis will seek to show whether the above
model can provide further insights into the unification experience of Italy and Germany. If
indeed we are to observe scenario (4) or (5) in either Italy or Germany, the above analysis
can help shed light on the dynamics of the Gini in response to unification.

2.4

Data

To study the hypothesis that inequality increased in response to unification, data is needed
for both the pre- and post-unification period in both Italy and Germany. In gathering this
data, this study faces two main challenges. First, historical data and in particular pre20th century data on inequality is scarcely available. Secondly, the study of impacts of
unification raises an additional challenge. Consistent data is only available for the postunification period, when both Italy and eventually Germany commenced to gather data at
the national level. For the pre-unification period, the scholar needs to rely on regional and
sub-regional data.

2.4.1

Italy

For Italy, a number of existing sources of data are available. For pre-unification Italian regional data, specifically Gini coefficients and inequality extraction ratios, the study by Alfani
and Ryckbosch (2016) provides data on Tuscany and Piedmont from 1500-1800, including
inequality extraction ratios. The study by Alfani finds that the inequality growth in Piedmont in the 18th century was driven by a process of society in Piedmont ”becoming more
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extractive”(P. 1088). Alfani also studies the share of the rich in a number of Italian regions.
The study by Malanima (2016) provides a unique insight on the distribution of income in a
Southern Italian city, namely Naples. Malanima’s study develops a social table, which will
be discussed below in greater detail, to produce a comprehensive overview of incomes across
Neapolitan social and professional classes in 1811. The recent study by Malanima aggregates
inequality extraction ratios for pre-unification Italy.
There is also existing work providing inequality data for post-unification Italy (see e.g.
Amendola and Vecchi, 2007 and A’hearn et al., 2020). Despite the availability of pre- and
post-unification data, there has thus far not been an attempt to put the data together to
study inequality in the context of Italian unification.

2.4.2

Germany

While data for Italy is available, albeit scarcely, German data is even more limited. An
overview of income inequality in post-unification Germany that considers the late nineteenth
century is provided by the study by Bartels (2019), which studies top incomes for Germany
from 1871 to 2014, using German tax data to estimate top incomes in unified Germany.
Dumke and Grant provide evidence of a Kuznets-style relationship for early-industrialized
Germany, making reference to earlier work of Soviet economist Prokopovitch, whose work
had influenced Kuznets (see Dumke, 1988, Grant, 2002, and Grant, 2004). Grant’s analysis is
based on Gini coefficients calculated using data from Prussian income tax statistics as well as
the Klassensteuer for the period before the introduction of the income tax. However, as noted
by Grant, the Klassensteuer was subject to frequent changes and there is no comparability
between Klassensteuer versus income tax estimates (see Grant, 2002, P. 6), undermining
comparisons between pre- and post-unification inequality. In addition, coverage does not
extend to other German states such as Bavaria. This study seeks to provide additional data
on income inequality for pre- and post-unification German states.
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A small number of studies has also considered other measures of inequality, particularly
inequality in land ownership (see Cinnirella and Hornung, 2016 and Ziblatt, 2008) and in
wealth (see Alfani et al., 2022). Yet, as Bartels et al. (2021) find, there is no positive
correlation between the data on inequality in land ownership and income inequality data,
which makes the former less useful for the scope of this study. The study by Schaff (2020)
links military conflict and greater extraction to increases in wealth inequality in the context
of pre-unification Germany from 1400 to 1800.

Pre-unification Germany
As mentioned above, while not being a singular state entity, pre-unification Germany was
not an assortment of unassociated states, but was characterized by a number of independent
states that were economically closely connected through the Zollverein, established in 1833.
States included the Kingdom of Prussia, the Kingdom of Bavaria, the Kingdom of Hannover
and other smaller states. To study inequality in the pre-unification setting, this study will
calculate measures of inequality, particularly Gini coefficients, for the two largest states of
pre-unification Germany, the Kingdom of Prussia and the Kingdom of Bavaria.
Why chose Bavaria as comparison with Prussia? First, the Kingdom of Bavaria was the
second largest pre-unification German state. But, beyond that, it also provides an ideal
counterpoint to Prussia similar to the comparison between Piedmont and the Kingdom of
the two Sicilies in the Italian case. Indeed, as Ziblatt (2004) points out, Bismarck considered
the status of Bavaria within a unified German state similar to the status of Southern Italy
within unified Italy, noting that Bavaria could provide ”the same element of weakness that
Southern Italy has created for that state” (see Ziblatt, 2004, P. 93). In addition, the Kingdom
of Bavaria is also an ideal candidate for statistical exploration, as there are primary data
sources available, in particular professional censuses, which enable the elaboration of a social
table. The same is the case for Prussia, for which detailed professional censuses are also
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available.

Social tables
Social tables represent a useful instrument to study the distribution of incomes in a preindustrial society. The work by Milanovic (2009) and Milanovic et al. (2010) explores social
tables for a number of countries, including England and Wales for 1801 and 1803, to study
trends in global inequality in a historical context. A number of other studies have also
used social tables to study inequality, including Malanima (2006) for Naples in 1811 (see
Milanovic (2010) for a survey of studies using social tables).
Social tables provide a bottom-up overview of the socio-economic structure of a society
on the basis of two main elements: The mean income of a specific professional or social
group as well as their share in a society. Social tables can thus be constructed on the basis
of income data and a professional/social census. Both of the elements, i.e. income and share
of population, can be derived for Prussia and Bavaria. This study provides social tables for
both states, providing insights into the distribution of incomes by deriving Gini coefficients
as well as inequality extraction ratios.
Social tables come with three caveats. First, being based on a ”bottom up” approach
that relies on the accuracy and coverage of the professional census data for the share of the
social/professional group in the population, it may have gaps in settings where professional
groups are not well defined or fail to capture incomes outside such well defined groups.
Secondly, social tables rely on accurate income data for a specific group to calculate the
mean income of a respective group. If the range of incomes used to calculate mean incomes
is large, there would be large within-group inequality, which a social table constructed using
mean incomes would mask. Third and relatedly, social tables also implicitly assume that
there are well defined and largely homogenous social groups and that therefore all or most
of the inequality within a society comes from the differences in income between the social
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groups. As Milanovic (2009) highlights, this structure of society can realistically be assumed
for pre-industrial societies, where social groups are well defined and within-group differences
are small.
In addition to ignoring differences in income within social groups, there is a risk that
social tables underreport very low and very high incomes. The former may be the case
when professional/social censuses do not adequately capture low income earners such as
subsistence farmers or those without any formal income as well as due to the difficulty of
measuring these informal and non-monetary sources of income. At the same time, social
tables may not capture parts of the very top of the distribution. While detailed data is often
available for high incomes of civil service and military leadership, it may not accurately
capture high incomes from the market economy, including in commerce and trade.

Bavaria, 1847
Social tables can provide a snapshot view of a society at a particular moment in time. The
Kingdom of Bavaria in 1847 was a state characterized by a large rural population and a
number of urban centers, particularly the Kingdom’s capital, Munich. 1847 is a date with
added significance as it was the year before the political upheavals of 1848.
As mentioned above, Bavaria lends itself well to the elaboration of social tables, as there
are several sources of data that can be ”mined” to construct a social table that captures
a large part of the Bavarian population. As stressed in the preceding section, social tables
require two main inputs: income data and population shares of social/professional groups.
For the Kingdom of Bavaria data sources are available for both. The latter can be derived
from the professional census that was conducted in 1847, containing information on the
number of individuals within each professional category, including various trades, such as
tailor, mechanic, blacksmith, carpenter and mason. The number of individuals on different
steps of the military hierarchy can be derived from the military handbook of the Kingdom
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of Bavaria, albeit only for the year 1860. However, in terms of the hierarchical structure
of the military, there would have been little change, as military structures were remarkably
consistent across the 19th century and even across countries (Heller, 2005). The source for
the number of farmers and agricultural day laborers and domestic workers is from the study
by Kocka (1990).
One key implicit choice that is made by using the professional census data, is that the
analysis will be based on individuals rather than households, as the census data provides the
number of individuals within each category. Accordingly, levels of subsistence and incomes
must be calculated with this implicit choice in mind, i.e. must be scaled to the individual
rather than a household.
The second major source for the social table, specifically for income data is Klose and
Jungmann-Stadler (2006), which provides mean incomes for the region of Northern Bavaria
for 1847. For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that these incomes are representative
of the Kingdom as a whole. Incomes for some of the groups, including domestic workers
and soldiers, include monetary and non-monetary remuneration, i.e. board and housing. In
order to ensure comparability with incomes that do not include additional remuneration, the
monetary value of non-monetary incomes are added to monetary incomes. The monetary
value is assumed to be subsistence level of board and housing, which was 89 Gulden for a
family with three children.
As mentioned above, the implicit choice of analyzing individuals rather than households
must be taken into account. Accordingly, the subsistence level for the family of three must
be broken down to the individual on the basis of equivalence scales. For the purpose of
this study the standard OECD approach to equivalence is used to take into account the
differing needs of children as well as potential ”economies of scale” within a household. The
subsistence level of board and housing for an individual is thus assumed to be 27.8 Gulden
per year, which is added to the annual average income of those groups whose total income
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was made up of monetary and non-monetary remuneration.
By combining the two variables - income and population share - the below social table
can be constructed, which provides a snapshot of Bavarian society in the mid-19th century.
There is a number of observations which can be drawn from a glance at the social table.
First, the coverage in terms of total population is close to 1.2 million, which is just under
the total adult male population of 1.5 million. In other words, the social table covers around
80% of the total adult male population. The remaining 20% are likely to include those not
or no longer in the labor force due to age or unemployment, as well as certain groups and
professions not captured by the professional census, likely both in the top and the bottom
of the income distribution. Indeed, based on the available data, there are two groups which
are likely missing, namely urban day laborers (other than domestic workers and coachmen)
as well as certain parts of the Kingdom’s civil administration.

Prussia, 1861
Similar to the Kingdom of Bavaria, the Kingdom of Prussia also conducted professional
censuses, which provide a comprehensive overview of the share of Prussian citizens employed
in various industries. The social table that this study puts forward for pre-unification Prussia
is based on the ”Prussian Statistics” of 1861/1862 prepared by the Royal Statistical Bureau
in Berlin.
The source for the second variable, mean incomes, is harder to come by at the national
and regional level. Yet, there is a set of subregional data, which has not been comprehensively
exploited within the economic literature, which can shed light on the income levels of different
professions and which this study will explore. The so-called Statistical Representations of
Counties are a unique source of data to study the social, economic and environmental realities
of counties in the Kingdom of Prussia in the early 1860s. Despite the rich data and insights
that the statistical representations provide, they have been scarcely used.
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Table 2.5: Social table - Bavaria, 1847
Number

%, Pop.

Inc/cap
(Gulden)

Inc/cap
($PPP)

Inc/cap
(/mean)

Soldier

79,498

6.756%

55

591.2

0.48

Farm Labourer/Farmer

460,000

39.092%

70

753.0

0.61

Domestic worker/coachman

40,000

3.399%

78

839.3

0.68

Tailor/Shoe maker/Baker/
Linen weaver/Wood turner/
Barrel maker/Clothier/
Mechanic

256,703

21.815%

94

1015.1

0.82

Butcher/Glazier/Hatter
Brewer/Furrier/Miller,
House painter/Nailer,
Plumber

29,228

2.484%

106

1141.3

0.92

Metalworker/Blacksmith/
Dyer/Wagon maker/
Pewterer

198,143

16.839%

132

1421.8

1.14

Sergeant

1,714

0.146%

136

1464.9

1.18

Tanner/Coppersmith,
Silk weaver/Book binder

6,219

0.529%

145

1562.0

1.26

Carpenter/Mason/Roofer

53,538

4.550%

205

2211.2

1.78

Teacher

8,633

0.734%

275

2966.3

2.39

First Lieutenant

1,160

0.099%

460

4959.8

3.99

Trade commissar

34,090

2.897%

478

5153.9

4.15

Captain

1,155

0.098%

1048

11302.2

9.10

Clergyman

6308

0.536%

1400

15101.1

12.16

Colonel

211

0.018%

2260

24375.5

19.62

Major General

80

0.007%

5020

54146.3

43.58

Bishop

16

0.001%

8000

86292.1

69.46

Commanding General

28

0.002%

8000

86292.1

69.46

1,176,724

100%

115.2

1242

1

Total

63
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The preamble of the Statistical Representation of the County Moers provides a brief insight into the history and mandate for the statistical documents. According to the preamble,
county administrators were advised in 1859 through a ministerial mandate to compile a statistical representation of their county alongside the census. The structure was recommended
to loosely follow a schematic provided to administrators in 1838, which led many counties to
compile statistics according to their own outline. Despite these heterogenous approaches, the
majority of statistical representations that are available include a core set of thematic focus
areas: 1. A territorial and historical overview; 2. Physiographic conditions; 3. Climatic
conditions; 4. Inhabitants; 5. Migratory flows; 6. Marriage and birth statistics; 7. Health
and mortality; 8. Housing; 9. Real estate and landed property; 10. Agriculture; 11. Livestock; 12. Commerce and transport; 13. Roads and waterways; 14. Conditions of working
population; 15. Poverty alleviation efforts; 16. Police force; 17. Sanitary infrastructure; 18.
Religious matters; 19. Education; 20 Civil and criminal justice; 21. Military.
As immediately evident from this exhaustive list of topics, the statistical representations
of counties can provide a unique and comprehensive insight into living conditions at the local
level in the Prussian empire. The documents contain both narrative explanations as well
as detailed statistical tables on the above mentioned themes. It is particularly the former
that bear witness to the socio-economic challenges of the Kingdom in the mid-nineteenth
century. This is particularly the case for those representations whose authors heavily editorialize, providing insights into the attitudes of county administrators towards their citizens.
Interestingly, these views vary widely between counties. While the administrator of Tecklenburg praises the ”great assiduity, commendable frugality and capacity for renouncement”
of the working classes, the administrator of Muensterberg bemoans the ”lack of education”
and the ”bad habits of the large cities” which have ”permeated the countryside” and have
led to ”naked vulgarity and wantonness” among farmhands and domestic workers.
Of particular interest for the scope of this study is number 14 of the above-mentioned
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focus areas, i.e. the conditions of the working populations, which provides wage data for a
wide range of professional groups. This study compiles this data to calculate populationweighted mean incomes for professional groups for the Kingdom, based on the data which
is available at the county level. Of the Statistical Representations, 24 counties are available
for this study, distributed across the Kingdom. The below map shows the availability of
statistical representations and their distribution across the empire.
The available regions cover only 6.3% of the population of the Kingdom, but nonetheless
provide a balanced representation of income data, given that counties in both the East and
West of the Kingdom are represented. By using population weighted averages, this study
seeks to provide mean incomes that reflect incomes in the Kingdom as a whole. On the basis
of the population-share data sourced from the professional census as well as the income data
from the county-level statistical representations, the below social table for Prussia can be
constructed (see Table 2.6 - 2.8).
The social table draws on a number of additional sources besides the professional census of
1863 and the Statistische Darstellungen. For the numbers of military personnel per category,
the study draws on the 1862 editions of the Militaerzeitung, i.e. the military journal, which
provides a breakdown of the hierarchical structure of the Prussian military. The total number
of soldiers is calculated by substracting the total number of higher-ranking military personnel
from the total number of military personnel that is listed in the professional census. The
pay of soldiers is derived from Heller (2005), which provides the relative pay of soldiers in
relation to the military hierarchy. The number of pensioned military officers is from Kist
(1871). The income of catholic priests, for which no source is available for Prussia, is assumed
to be in line with the income of catholic priests in Bavaria. Detailed data on the hierarchy
of the Prussian civil service, including pay and number of individuals, is provided by Hermes
(1921).
On the basis of this social table, the Gini coefficient and inequality extraction ratio can
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Figure 2.1: Location of available Statistical Representations

Source: Author’s elaboration
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Table 2.6: Social table - Prussia, 1863
Number

%, Pop.

Inc/cap
(Taler)

Inc/cap
($PPP)

Inc/cap
(/mean)

Unemployed

180561

3.1574%

0.0

0.0

0.00

Recipient of alms

330003

5.7706%

21.1

300.0

0.20

Domestic worker

37465

0.6551%

49.4

703.2

0.47

Maid

500532

8.7525%

53.1

754.8

0.50

Soldier

210937

3.6885%

59.9

852.0

0.57

Female day laborer

565705

9.8921%

61.4

872.9

0.58

Farm laborer

558435

9.7650%

68.0

967.1

0.65

Day laborer

1367024

23.9043%

86.2

1226.1

0.82

Factory worker

719908

12.5886%

131.8

1874.9

1.25

Bricklayer/carpenter
/shoemaker

560551

9.8020%

138.2

1965.2

1.31

Miner

39456

0.6899%

144.3

2052.8

1.37

Policeman

2603

0.0455%

145.0

2062.2

1.38

155269

2.7151%

152.0

2162.4

1.44

Weaver

9519

0.1665%

191.3

2721.1

1.82

Adm. Messenger

329

0.0058%

225.0

3200.0

2.14

Craftsman (Blacksmith
/Metal worker)

367538

6.4269%

228.6

3250.9

2.17

Cigarmaker

24697

0.4319%

234.0

3328.0

2.23

Seconde-Lieutenant

7174

0.1254%

300.0

4266.7

2.85

Premier-Lieutenant

1728

0.0302%

350.0

4977.8

3.33

Trader

12521

0.2189%

400.0

5688.9

3.80

Office clerk

89

0.0016%

525.0

7466.7

4.99

Forestry assessor

25

0.0004%

600.0

8533.3

5.71

County secretary

331

0.0058%

650.0

9244.4

6.18

Civil service officer

524

0.0092%

750.0

10666.7

7.13

Catholic priest

3874

0.0677%

798.0

11349.3

7.59

Pensioned Officer

4583

0.0801%

849.1

12075.5

8.08

Teacher

46227

0.8083%

850.0

12088.9

8.08

24

0.0004%

900.0

12800.0

8.56

Tailor

Police counsel
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Table 2.7: Social table - Prussia, 1863 [continued]
Number

%, Pop.

Inc/cap
(Taler)

Inc/cap
($PPP)

Inc/cap
(/mean)

Mining counsel

10

0.0002%

900.0

12800.0

8.56

Post inspector

26

0.0005%

950.0

13511.1

9.04

Banker

550

0.0096%

1000.0

14222.2

9.51

County administrator

326

0.0057%

1000.0

14222.2

9.51

State/medical counsel

26

0.0005%

1000.0

14222.2

9.51

Councilor of the consistory

17

0.0003%

1050.0

14933.3

9.99

Post counsel

24

0.0004%

1050.0

14933.3

9.99

Forestry inspector

57

0.0010%

1050.0

14933.3

9.99

Captain/Cavalry captain

2126

0.0372%

1100.0

15644.4

10.46

Protestant pastor

6329

0.1107%

1112.0

15815.1

10.58

Counsel

8

0.0001%

1200.0

17066.7

11.41

Mining director

10

0.0002%

1300.0

18488.9

12.36

Chief mining counsel

16

0.0003%

1300.0

18488.9

12.36

Senior civil counsel

52

0.0009%

1300.0

18488.9

12.36

Senior civil servant, Cat.4

268

0.0047%

1300.0

18488.9

12.36

Senior counsel, Cat.3

6

0.0001%

1400.0

19911.1

13.32

Police president

14

0.0002%

1500.0

21333.3

14.27

Chief forester

24

0.0004%

1600.0

22755.6

15.22

Chief post officer

26

0.0005%

1750.0

24888.9

16.65

Major

692

0.0121%

2000.0

28444.4

19.02

Director of the consistory

2

0.0000%

2250.0

32000.0

21.40

Judicial civil servant, Cat.3

51

0.0009%

2400.0

34133.3

22.83

Senior counsel, Cat.2

93

0.0016%

2400.0

34133.3

22.83

Chief mining officer

4

0.0001%

2500.0

35555.6

23.78

Tax administrator

8

0.0001%

3000.0

42666.7

28.53

Senior civil servant, Cat.3

25

0.0004%

3000.0

42666.7

28.53
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Table 2.8: Social table - Prussia, 1863 [continued]
Number

%, Pop.

Inc/cap
(Taler)

Inc/cap
($PPP)

Inc/cap
(/mean)

125

0.0022%

3000.0

42666.7

28.53

Senior civil servant, Cat.2

9

0.0002%

3466.7

49303.7

32.97

Ministerial director

11

0.0002%

3500.0

49777.8

33.29

Senior counsel, Cat.1

3

0.0001%

3750.0

53333.3

35.67

Major general

83

0.0015%

4020.0

57173.3

38.24

Undersecretary of state

3

0.0001%

4250.0

60444.4

40.42

Lieutenant general

37

0.0006%

5260.0

74808.9

50.03

Senior civil servant, Cat.1

9

0.0002%

6000.0

85333.3

57.07

Ordnance general

1

0.0000%

7320.0

104106.7

69.62

General

32

0.0006%

7320.0

104106.7

69.62

Government Minister

8

0.0001%

10000.0

142222.2

95.12

General field-marshal

1

0.0000%

16500.0

234666.7

156.94

5,718,744

100%

105.14

1495.3

1.00

Colonel

Total

be calculated. The Gini coefficient for Prussia in 1863 is 0.34. In line with the methodology
by Milanovic (2009), the maximum feasible Gini can be calculated. As in Milanovic (2009)
the subsistence minimum is conservatively assumed to be 300 $PPP.
The Statistical Representations also provide information on the monetary needs for a
family of five in the respective regions in 1863. The lowest of the regional estimates of monetary need is used in order to arrive at the most conservative measure of subsistence, assumed
to cover only what is truly needed for survival. In line with the equivalence scales for the
individual as outlined above, the subsistence minimum is 21.1 German Taler. Accordingly,
the conversion rate of $PPP to Taler is 14.22 to 1. The maximum feasible Gini for Prussia
is thus 0.80 and the inequality extraction ratio 41.9%.
Similar to the case of the social table for Bavaria, the social table for Prussia covers only
the population that can be accounted for by the available data. As shown in the above social
table, the total number of inhabitants that can be mapped for the Kingdom of Prussia is 5.7
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million, which compares to a total working age (14-60) male population of 5.3 million. Once
again, the social table covers individuals rather than households. Contrary to the Bavarian
case, data is available for unemployed and those receiving social assistance, but may not
fully account for pensioners as well as certain categories of professions, such as those with
income from trade and self-employment.

Post-unification Germany
Similar to the pre-unification setting, data availability for post-unification Germany is limited. Yet, the availability of primary data is greater for post-unification Germany, given the
push at a state level to compile more comprehensive data, including for fiscal purposes. As
mentioned above, Bartels (2019) provides data on top income shares on the basis of tax data.
As highlighted by Bartels (2019), there are a number of studies that use income tax data to
analyze aspects of the income distribution in Germany, including the work of Tilly (2010).
The availability of this data depends on the time of adoption of taxes, notably income
taxes, which were not uniformly introduced across the Empire, but sequentially at the state
level. While the introduction of an income tax in Hessen predates unification, Lippe and
Schwarzburg-Sonderhausen, the two last to adopt the tax, only introduced an income tax
in 1912 (Mares and Queralt, 2015). Prussia and Bavaria introduced income taxes in 1891
and 1910, respectively. For Prussia before 1891, data on income brackets and respective
population shares are available on the basis of fiscal data for the so-called class tax. The
data distinguishes between 13 different income brackets with incomes from below 140 Thaler
to 900-1000 Thaler. For higher incomes data is available for an additional 48 brackets. The
highest bracket of between 1.68 and 1.7 million Thaler contains only 1 individual. This data
is compiled in the annex in tables 2.11 and 2.12 on the basis of the data contained in the
Journal of the Royal Prussian Statistical Bureau of 18755 .
5

see Zeitschrift des Koeniglich Preussischen Statistischen Bureaus (1875)
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Another early adopter of income taxes was Saxony, which introduced the income tax
in 1874 and also significantly expanded statistical capacity to measure the tax base and
gather fiscal data. One such dataset compiled between 1879 and 1894 is income data by
income brackets and population shares within such income brackets. Such data enable the
calculation of Gini coefficients and inequality extraction ratios. Table 2.13 in the annex
compiles this data within one table.
Calculating the Gini index on the basis of income brackets comes with a number of
common side-effects. One of the primary concerns relates to the possible over-estimation of
incomes. This may happen, for instance, in the lowest income bracket, where, if the bottom
bracket is very wide, a measure of the mean may overstate incomes. In the case of Prussia.
using averages, the income of the lower bracket from 0-140 Thaler, which may include a
large number of unemployed or under-employed individuals, may overstate the earnings,
when an average income of 70 Thaler is assumed. The same may happen across the income
distribution, particularly if brackets are very wide. A possible over-estimation of incomes
could in turn lead to an under-estimation of the inequality extraction ratio, as the maximum
feasible Gini could be over-estimated.
As mentioned above, a comprehensive income tax was only introduced in Bavaria in 1910.
Nonetheless, income tax was levied on a part of society across three (very) broad tax groups,
which were further subdivided into income ranges. An overview of this tax income across
the three groups for 1890 can be derived from the Statistical Yearbook of the Kingdom of
Bavaria (1894), as listed in Table 2.14 in the annex. The first group contains salaried labor,
the second income from scientific, artistic labor and income from leased property and mining
and the third various pay and pensions. The total coverage is of 560 thousand people. The
Gini coefficient of the listed income is 0.34 and the inequality extraction ratio is 37.6%. In
order to gain additional insights into the distribution of income in Bavaria in the decade
after unification, social tables can also be utilized to calculate measures of inequality. Table
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2.15 in the annex provides a social table for Bavaria based on the Professional census of
1882 contained in the Statistical Yearbook of the Kingdom of Bavaria (1894). Incomes of the
respective groups are based on data from the 1870s contained in Klose (2002), Kocka (1990)
for selected groups of workers, Zeller (1889) for civil servants and the Statistical Yearbook of
the Kingdom of Bavaria (1894) for forestry workers. The total coverage is of over 2.7 million
individuals. On the basis of income data and population weights contained in the social
table, the Gini coefficient is 0.33 and the inequality extraction ratio 38.5%. These values are
very close to the above-noted figures for the Gini coefficient and IER calculated on the basis
of tax data.

2.5

Results: E pluribus inaequalitas?

It is time to put the evidence together. A first step is to compare the new data for preunification Germany contained in the Social tables of Prussia and Bavaria. Table 2.9 below
shows the key data points of Prussia and Bavaria. The findings suggest that differences
in the distribution of income, as expressed by the maximum feasible Gini and actual Gini,
were small between Prussia and Bavaria. Available data for Italy suggests that differences
between states were more pronounced between Italian states (see table 2.10).
Table 2.9: Comparing Bavaria and Prussia

Subsistence Minimum (LC)
Subsistence Minimum ($PPP)
Mean income
Mean income in $PPP
Conversion $PPP/LC (based on subsistence)
Mean income in terms of s (s=300)
G* - Maximum feasible Gini
Actual Gini
Inequality Extraction ratio

Bavaria, 1847

Prussia, 1863

27.813
300
115.2
1242
10.7865
4.1411
0.76
0.32
42.2%

21.094
300
105.1
1495
14.222
4.9842
0.80
0.33
41.9%
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Table 2.10: Inequality Extraction Ratios - Italy

1700
1750
1800
1811
1861
1871
1881

Tuscany

Piedmont

106.3
111.3

88.0
91.4
96.1

Naples

Italy

53.7
80.7
74.8
66.9

Source: Malanima, Alfani & A’hearn et al.

Interpreting the results
The simple model of unification and inequality provided a number of pointers for the study
of the cases of Italy and Germany. It showed, subject to a number of assumptions, that if a
lower inequality peripheral state and a higher inequality core state are unified and income is
redistributed from the former to the latter, inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient,
and inequality extraction, as measured by the inequality extraction ratio, will raise for the
new nation as a whole.
Can the model shed light on the unification experience of Italy and effects on the distribution of income? Figure 2.2 and 2.3 below show the available evidence. Figure 2.3 draws
on the combined inequality extraction ratios for Italy as developed by Malanima (2020). As
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show, there is indeed evidence to suggest that a number of assumptions
of the model hold for the case of Italian unification. First, the available data for regions
suggest that inequality in the Northern regions of Tuscany and Piedmont was indeed higher
than for Naples in the South prior to unification.
Secondly, inequality extraction following unification is higher than in the South prior to
unification and lower than in the North. It is important to keep in mind that, as the simple
model of unification and inequality shows, the inequality extraction ratio is not the weighted
average between various regions. Third, Figures 2.2 and 2.3 suggest a sudden increase in

CHAPTER 2. INCOME INEQUALITY AND UNIFICATION IN 19TH CENTURY

74

inequality extraction ratios in response to unification. This is an important finding that
supports the hypothesis that unification increased inequality extraction in Italy.
Is this level of inequality and extraction higher than it would have been in the absence
of implicit or explicit redistribution from South to North? To analyze this on the basis
of available information on the income distribution of the North and South, a number of
assumptions need to made. Data on Gini coefficients are available for Piedmont and Naples
for 1800 and 1811, respectively. Assuming that Gini coefficients for these two are representative of the Gini coefficients of Piedmont and Naples just before unification, a Gini coefficient can be calculated for a simulated union of two regions with the same Gini coefficients
and randomly generated distributions of income, thus generating an imaginary Kingdom of
Piedmont-Naples. Once again, a key assumption would be equivalence of mean incomes.
For such a simulated union, the post-unification Gini coefficient would be 0.47, which
is significantly below the Gini coefficient for unified Italy of around 0.6, as reported by
Amendola and Vecchi (2017) and in A’hearn et al. (2020). Such a finding would align
with scenarios (4) and (5), i.e. suggesting that there may have been redistribution from
South to North. Yet, it is imperative to note that such calculations are highly sensitive to
assumptions, including on the relative population shares. Further research on the possible
size of redistribution is thus needed to complement this ”back of the envelope” calculation,
ideally on the basis of additional data.
The finding of higher extraction from the South, as measured by the inequality extraction ratios is in line with the work by de Oliveira and Guerriero (2018), who argue that as
a result of unification and the ensuing political union under the leadership of the North6
”both region-specific tax rates are selected by the Northern elite, who cares less about the
6

The political leadership and bureaucracy of Italy following unification was heavily dominated by the
North, with 85% of prime ministers between 1861 and 1911 being from the North (see de Oliveira and
Guerreiro, 2018 as well as Duggan, 2014). Duggan (2014) also notes that prefects of the states were largely
Piedmontese and personal acquaintances of the king or the prime-minister.
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Figure 2.2: Inequality extraction ratios - Italy and regions (1500-1900)

Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of Malanima (2006), Alfani and Ryckbosch (2016), Amendola and Vecchi (2017)

Figure 2.3: Inequality extraction ratios - Italy (1500-1900)

Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of of Malanima (2020), Amendola and Vecchi (2017)
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Southern citizenry’s utility” (pp. 143) and that the ”Piedmontese-led ruling class favored
the Northern export-oriented farming and manufacturing industry while selecting trade, financial, and fiscal policies and the Northern population when levying the taxes needed to
finance the necessary expenses.”(pp. 146)
This observation yields support to the view that taxes raised in the South may have been
disproportionally spent on industrialization in the North, thus redistributing income from
the South to the North, as Figures 2.2 and 2.3 suggest. Indeed, as de Oliveira and Guerriero
(2018) highlight, railway investment was heavily concentrated in the North, with the Northern regions of Liguria and Piedmont-Aosta Valley receiving 18 times higher investments in
railway than other regions. Such investment was largely backed by resources mobilized from
property taxes on land, disproportionally levied on the South (see de Oliviera and Guerriero,
2018). Overall, the analysis advanced in this study suggest that unification did contribute
to inequality in the case of Italy.
Figure 2.4 depicts the findings for Germany, depicting inequality extraction ratios for
German states before and after unification. It also shows a composite measure of inequality
extraction for post-unification Germany as a whole (dotted line) on the basis of available data
for Prussia, Bavaria and Saxony. This composite measure should be taken with caution as
it combines different years and heterogenous tax regimes with different tax brackets. Figure
2.4 suggests that the changes to the distribution of income in response to unification in
Germany were much smaller compared to those in Italy.
In analyzing the case of Germany, it is important to consider a key difference to Italy:
Germany adopted a federal state model instead of a unified model, as highlighted in the research by Ziblatt (2004). This difference may have an impact on how financing is channeled
from the periphery to the core. In Germany, due to the federal structure, the transmission
channel of extraction from periphery to core was less direct than in the case of Italy. In
contrast to Italy, as noted by Mares and Queralt (2015), ”the 1870 German constitution
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Figure 2.4: IERs for pre- and post-unification Germany

Source: Author’s elaboration, Note: * indicates calculations based on tax data; combined Germany is a
composite measure of tax data of Prussia, Bavaria and Saxony

limited significantly the ability of the central government to raise direct taxes and left significant fiscal policy authority in the hands of subnational governments”. The role of the federal
government was largely limited to rising fiscal revenue for military spending, which, however,
in the context of the 19th century, represented an important fiscal responsibility (Mares and
Queralt, 2015). Overall, the findings for Germany suggest that the limited ability of the
central government to raise significant revenues from the individual states prevented greater
inequality and inequality extraction in response to unification.
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Concluding Remarks

As highlighted by the widely reproduced chart by Gornick and Milanovic7 , which shows
market inequality alongside inequality after redistributive policy action, inequality can be
argued to be a policy choice. This research, which studies unification, supports this viewpoint by showing the effects of policy choice, implemented in response to unification, on the
distribution of income in Germany and Italy. As over a short period of time under review,
i.e. a the years before and after unification, market forces are not likely to significantly alter
the distribution of income, it is policy choices that affect income inequality in the short-term.
This research suggests that if policies redistribute from lower inequality regions to higher
inequality regions, then inequality will rise in the whole country. The policy implications
extend beyond the case of unification. In particular, the research opens up opportunities
for a further analysis of unification or ”unification-type” scenarios, including of German
unification in 1990 as well as regional development beyond the unification context, including
research on the European Union. A key policy implication of this research is that policy
makers should take into account differences in inequality between regions, not just as a
matter of regional but as a matter of national policy on inequality.
This research contributes to the study of inequality by providing new insights into the
linkages between unification and related policy choices on inequality and inequality extraction by providing a comparative study of Italy and Germany in the context of nineteenth
century unification, which has previously been unexplored in the literature on inequality.
The research also provides new data on inequality for pre- and post-unification Germany,
particularly Gini coefficients and inequality extraction ratios.
This study also sheds more light on linkages between institutional structures/governance
frameworks and the distribution of incomes and inequality. In doing so, it connects the
7

see Gornick and Johnson (2020) for the latest update
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research on federalism with the literature on inequality extraction. Indeed, the study finds
evidence to suggest that the federal state system in Germany may have tapered inequality
extraction by slowing the extractive power of centralized fiscal policy. Further comparative
research on Germany and Italy is needed to analyze in greater depth the effects of state
systems on the distribution of income in post-unification Germany and Italy.

Chapter 3
Inequality convergence in developing
countries
3.1

Introduction

The ideal starting point for a study of inequality convergence using LIS data is a quote
by Atkinson (2004), who noted that ”the importance of data comparability in such empirical studies of convergence was recognized clearly by Benabou: ”the binding constraint ...is
data”. The aim of LIS is to ease that constraint”(P. 182). This study will explore inequality convergence at the subnational level for developing countries, building on the increased
availability of LIS microdata, which indeed has ’eased the constraint’ on studying inequality
convergence.
In doing so, this study will seek to provide new insights into regional inequality convergence across developing countries, which has not been studied yet in a comparative context.
Existing studies on subnational inequality convergence focus on individual countries. The
greater availability of LIS data allows - for the first time - for a comparative study, as
previously no comparable data was available at sufficient scale.
80
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This study also contributes to the literature by using the convergence club methodology. Existing studies, such as the work of Bournakis et al. (2020) focus on ”traditional”
convergence theory only. Studying club convergence can provide additional policy insights,
enabling policy makers to target policies to specific regions. Geographic representation of
convergence clubs can help explore regional ”clusters” of inequality. In addition, the study
explores the role of the state system - unitary or federal - on inequality convergence and the
ability of policymakers to tackle subnational inequality through region-specific policies.

3.2

Literature Review

There are existing strands of literature on inequality convergence (see for instance Benabou,
1996 and Ravallion, 2003 for cross-national research or Bournakis et al., 2020 for crossregional research). Yet, thus far, no comprehensive comparative study exists on regional
inequality convergence from a cross-country perspective and particularly for developing countries. This study seeks to fill this gap and calculate regional measures of inequality across
countries on the basis of LIS data.

3.2.1

Research on inequality convergence

The foundational study on inequality convergence is the contribution of Benabou (1996),
which lays the theoretical groundwork for convergence of inequality over time. In addressing
the question on whether inequality converges among countries, Benabou seeks to go beyond
”the first moment of each countries income distribution” (see P. 51), which is the main focus
of the literature that studies convergence in per capita incomes, thus building upon the work
of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992).
Benabou (1996) identifies three concrete arguments for moving beyond the first moment
and for considering higher moments. First, it can provide important insights for policy and
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can help identify whether gaps in inequality between nations are permanent or narrowing.
Secondly, it can collect evidence on the long-run linkages between credit market incompleteness on one hand, and inequality and social mobility on the other. Third, and perhaps
most importantly, it can provide insights into dynamics within neoclassical growth models,
which as Benabou (1996) argues ”imply convergence in distribution” and could hint at ”the
presence of some form of increasing return or complementarity in the economic or politicoeconomic structure” (P. 51).
To study higher moments, Benabou uses the same approach as Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1992), i.e. using regression analysis of initial values and rates of change. Benabou uses
a panel of OECD countries on the basis of LIS data as well as data by Deininger and
Squire (1995). Benabou finds a negative coefficient indicating mean reversion in inequality
between 1970 and 1980. A caveat of Benabou’s study is the limited availability and lack of
comparability of data across different countries, some of which based on expenditure and
others on income data.
Another important study on inequality convergence is the work by Ravallion (2003),
which seeks to explore whether there is evidence of unconditional inequality convergence
across countries on the basis of greater data availability. The main channel, according to
Ravallion (2003), through which such unconditional convergence would take place is through
liberalizing economic policy reforms. In countries with previous policies benefiting the rich
and thus high inequality, economic policy reforms would lead to a decrease in inequality. In
countries with previous pro-poor policies, the opposite effect would be in play. Ravallion
(2003) finds evidence of unconditional convergence across different specifications. He finds
an implied steady-state Gini between 0.4 and 0.41, close to the datasets mean. As noted
by Ravallion (2003), ”the process of convergence toward medium inequality implied by these
results is clearly not rapid, and it should not be forgotten that there are deviations from these
trends, both over time and across countries” (P. 355).

CHAPTER 3. INEQUALITY CONVERGENCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

3.2.2

83

Emerging focus on regional inequality convergence

Over the past years, there has been a renewed focus on inequality convergence within countries and the European Union. Savoia (2019) studies convergence of income inequality across
the EU. The research analyzes income inequality convergence from 1990 to 2013 with a focus
on possible effects of the European Cohesion Policy funds. The study builds on LIS data
on disposable household income for NUTS 2 units, using a top-bottom procedure for the
removal of extreme values and LIS equivalence scale to equivalise. Savoia finds evidence of
inequality convergence to higher levels of inequality across NUTS 2 units, which are thus
becoming ”equally more unequal”. This process is more pronounced for areas with comparable characteristics such as governance structures as well as eligibility for European Cohesion
Policy funds.
There is also an increasing number of new studies of inequality convergence at the regional level for individual developing countries. One of them is the research by Bournakis et
al. (2020), which studies income inequality disparities and convergence across 27 Egyptian
regions. The analysis is based on LIS data and finds evidence of unconditional inequality
convergence. Mendoza-Velazquez et al (2020) study convergence of inequality across Mexican
regions from 1940 to 2015. Most notably, the research also examines club convergence across
Mexican states, the only comprehensive study to date to study club convergence in regional
inequality for developing countries. The authors build on the methodology by Phillips and
Sul (2007) to study club convergence, testing for club convergence of GDP per capita and
the Euclidean Norm Index (ENI) index as measure of distribution. While the authors do
not find evidence of inequality convergence over the entire sample, their results suggest that
there are two convergence clubs. The first club largely contains regions with the highest
levels of inter-regional inequality. The second a set of more homogenous regions with lower
levels of inter-regional inequality.
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Methodological Framework
Inequality convergence

The ”traditional” test for convergence builds on the work of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992)
and regresses changes over a given time horizon on an initial level of the indicator under
observation. In the case of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) this latter indicator is income
per capita. In the context of inequality convergence, the same principle can be applied to
the Gini coefficient.
As noted by Ravallion (2003), the equation to test for inequality convergence can be
expressed as follows:

GiD − Gi0 = a + bGi0 + ei

(3.1)

where GiD denotes the Gini coefficient observed in time D and Gi0 at the initial time. b
represents the parameter of interest, commonly referred to as the convergence parameter. If
this parameter is negative and statistically significant, there is indication of convergence.

3.3.2

Inequality convergence clubs

The analysis of convergence clubs is based on the original contribution by Phillips and Sul
(2007). The significant addition to the scholarship provided by the two authors is to move
beyond a conception of convergence that is homogenous. Instead, Phillips and Sul (2007)
provide a methodological approach that allows for the analysis of heterogenous paths of
convergence. The method has been applied largely in the analysis of convergence in per
capita incomes (see for instance Bartowska and Riedl, 2012 or Artelaris et al., 2010) with a
few exceptions, notably the aforementioned work by Mendoza-Velazquez et al. (2020), which
studies inequality convergence clubs in the case of Mexico.
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Following the methodology of Phillips and Sul (2007) the model of convergence clubs can
be used for the specific case of inequality convergence, thus introducing the second moment,
i.e. a Gini coefficient as measure of distribution, instead of the first moment, i.e. per capita
income, used by the authors in the original 2007 paper. In line with Mendoza-Velazquez et
al. (2020), a factor model can be specified as follows:

Xit = δit µt

(3.2)

with δit representing a transition parameter and µt a common growth component.
In line with Phillips and Sul (2007), a semi-parametric model can then be written to test
for the hypothesis of convergence by looking at the parameter of interest, which is δit , i.e.
the time-varying coefficient:

δit = δi +

σi ξit
L(t)tα

(3.3)

with δi being a fixed parameter, σi an idiosyncratic scale parameter, ξit being i.i.d (0,1), α
the decay rate, and L(t) a varying function (see Bartowska and Riedl, 2012 and MendozaVelazquez et al., 2020).
A log-t test can then be performed with a null hypothesis:
H0 : δi = δ and α ≥ 0
and alternative hypothesis:
HA : δi 6= δ and α < 0
For a model specified as follows that can be estimated using OLS:

log

HA
= α + βlogt + ut
Ht

(3.4)
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being the variance ratio for a cross sectional setting and β as the convergence

parameter associated with the time-variant parameter δit (see Sichera and Pizzuto, 2019, P.
143).

3.4
3.4.1

Data
Level of analysis

Before looking closer into the available data, it is imperative to establish the level of analysis
and clearly define the geographic units that will be analyzed. While being a cross-national
study, this study will look at subnational units, i.e. at state-level units, equivalent to US
states. For Brazil, for instance, it will conduct analysis for the 27 regions that make up the
Brazilian federal state. Throughout the paper the terms regional and subnational will be
used interchangeably. In the context of this study, the term ”region” exclusively refers to
subnational geographic units.

3.4.2

Exploring LIS data

In order to collect evidence on inequality convergence in developing countries, LIS data
represents an ideal starting point, given the rich disaggregation that the LIS micro-data
offer, particularly with regards to regional disaggregation. Distributional data for developing
countries is available at a growing rate. For the purpose of this study, all developing countries,
here defined as non-OECD countries, are selected for which data is available for at least
three waves. The countries for which this applies are Brazil, Colombia, Georgia, Guatemala,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, South Africa and Uruguay. Table 3.1 below shows a short overview
of the years that are available for these countries.
For the years outlined in Table 3.1 above, consistent regional disaggregation is available
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Table 3.1: Non-OECD Countries with 3+ years of LIS data
Country

Available years

Brazil
Colombia
Georgia
Guatemala
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
South Africa
Uruguay

2006, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2016
2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019
2006, 2011, 2014
2007, 2010, 2013, 2016
2000, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016
2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016
2008, 2010, 2012, 2015, 2017
2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016

for all years and countries, with the exception of Paraguay for the 2007, 2010 and 2013 waves
for which only a subset of regions are available and which will thus be excluded from the analysis. The key variables of interest from the LIS data for the scope of this study is disposable
household income (dhi) and wage income at the personal level (pi11). The two variables are
chosen to explore whether there are any marked differences in inequality convergence before
and after redistributive policies. The former indicator reflects such redistributive policies, as
it contains taxes and transfers.
A number of steps are implemented for data preparation of LIS microdata for the purpose
of this study. All years are subject to top and bottom coding to eliminate data with extreme
values. Moreover, the data is equivalised with the LIS equivalence scale, which equivalizes
the disposable household income with the square root of individuals in a household. The
income data is also adjusted by CPI and PPP using PPP deflators provided by LIS1 to
enable comparability between countries and regions.
Table 3.2 denotes a summary of key statistics from the above-mentioned list of countries.
In analysing subnational-level data from LIS it is critical to keep in mind that disaggregated
indicators are not designed to be representative surveys at the subnational level. It is thus
1

see www.lisdatacenter.org/resources/ppp-deflators/
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important to take a close look at the number of observations within the subnational units,
which represent the basis for the calculation of the Gini coefficient.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Country

Year

Number of
Regions

Mean
(dhi)

Median
(dhi)

P90/P50 ratio
(dhi)

Gini
(dhi)

Gini
(pi11)

Brazil

2006
2009
2011
2013
2016

27
27
27
27
27

8503
9442
9949
10927
10046

5294
6207
6736
7533
6939

3.32
3.09
2.95
2.83
2.91

0.505
0.477
0.469
0.460
0.482

0.489
0.468
0.455
0.445
0.452

Colombia

2004
2007
2010
2013
2016

23
23
23
23
23

5137
7341
7491
8210
8194

3058
4183
4571
5333
5598

3.39
3.61
3.33
3.11
2.86

0.533
0.556
0.518
0.499
0.474

0.451
0.510
0.463
0.443
0.407

Georgia

2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

4257
4465
4617
5100
5934
6385
6494
6739
6456
6331
6716

2879
3151
3180
3824
4439
4909
5070
5181
5015
5132
5428

3.05
2.83
2.73
2.52
2.56
2.61
2.36
2.51
2.53
2.37
2.33

0.466
0.453
0.455
0.411
0.402
0.391
0.390
0.391
0.409
0.370
0.379

0.463
0.475
0.501
0.449
0.461
0.444
0.435
0.428
0.429
0.397
0.386

Guatemala

2006
2011
2014

22
22
22

8127
6250
6050

5319
3921
4465

3.02
3.15
2.37

0.489
0.518
0.411

0.566
0.486
0.468

Panama

2007
2010
2013
2016

12
12
12
12

12082
12956
14530
16942

8275
8983
10286
11974

3.05
2.90
2.86
2.87

0.483
0.477
0.468
0.461

0.432
0.400
0.420
0.381

Paraguay

2000
2004
2007
2010
2013
2016

16
16
16
16
16
16

10507
8654
9680
10498
12375
11871

6360
5363
6178
6992
8402
7995

3.32
3.14
2.98
2.83
2.93
2.86

0.539
0.507
0.504
0.502
0.479
0.489

0.491
0.464
0.424
0.421
0.424
0.401

Peru

2004
2007
2010
2013
2016

8
8
8
8
8

5479
6770
7647
8259
8536

3559
4544
5518
6264
6485

3.23
3.16
2.79
2.63
2.63

0.542
0.512
0.481
0.459
0.454

0.543
0.534
0.509
0.461
0.462

South Africa

2008
2010
2012
2015
2017

13
13
13
13
13

8984
10144
10564
11524
12240

3334
3971
4567
5105
5588

6.72
5.41
5.56
5.20
5.34

0.658
0.664
0.621
0.623
0.616

0.646
0.621
0.614
0.630
0.624

Uruguay

2004
2007
2010
2013
2016

19
19
19
19
19

9378
11486
13261
14654
15290

6562
7926
9708
11521
12178

2.81
2.85
2.60
2.37
2.31

0.433
0.429
0.400
0.370
0.360

0.462
0.459
0.433
0.382
0.374
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Table 3.3: Average number of households within regions

Mean N per region

Mean N per region

BRA

COL

GEO

GUA

PAN

5489

9632

299

524

887

PAR

PER

SAF

URU

639

4473

2377

830

Table 3.3 below shows the average number of household by region for the latest wave
available. As the table suggests the number varies across countries. In Colombia, there
are in excess of 9500 households on average for each region, while in Georgia only 299.
This impacts the accuracy of the Gini coefficient and should be taken into account when
interpreting the results for the various countries. One potentially problematic issue is that
two composite regions for South Africa have only 39 and 79 households in the regional
sub-sample, which represents a low number of households to calculate the Gini coefficient.

3.5
3.5.1

Results
Cross-country convergence

A first analysis of interest is to study convergence across countries to identify possible convergence trends at the cross-country level in line with the research by Benabou (1996) and
Ravallion (2003). The Gini coefficients reported in Table 3.4 can inform such an analysis,
which is depicted in Figure 3.1. The change in the Gini coefficient from the latest to the
respective base years is plotted on the y-axis and the Gini coefficient in the base year on
the x-axis. The regression line, which is slightly upward sloping, does not yield support
to a hypothesis of convergence across this set of developing countries: The beta coefficient,
reported on the first line of table 3.4, is not statistically significant.
This chart should be treated with caution as the base year differs from country by country,
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Figure 3.1: Inequality convergence across developing countries (dhi)

Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of LIS microdata

thus potentially giving larger weights to countries that have longer time frames of data
availability. To rectify the issues, the annualized change from the base year to the latest year
can be calculated for each available country. Figure 3.2 depicts the relationship between the
change from the base year to latest and the initial Gini on an annualized basis for disposable
household income. As Figure 3.2 suggests, there is no evidence of convergence in inequality
across developing countries. Table 3.4 reports the beta coefficients for the absolute and
annualized data. The analysis can also be conducted on the basis of the Gini coefficients
calculated using personal wage income (pi11). As Figure 3.3 below suggests, there is no
evidence of convergence in this case either.
To gather further evidence on unconditional convergence across countries, an analysis
of regions across developing countries can provide further insights. Figure 3.4 depicts the
convergence chart for the 151 regions of developing countries for the Ginis based on both
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Figure 3.2: Inequality convergence across developing countries, annualized (dhi)

Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of LIS microdata

Table 3.4: Convergence Test

Absolute change (dhi)
Annualized change (dhi)
Annualized change (pi11)

Intercept

Beta

St.d Error

t-value

-0.06539
-0.006370
-0.006500

0.01643
0.001962
0.000741

0.14687
0.015400
0.016097

0.112
0.127
0.046
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Figure 3.3: Inequality convergence across developing countries (pi11)

Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of LIS microdata

Table 3.5: Convergence Test

Gini (dhi)
Gini (pi11)

Intercept
0.005527*
0.015093***

Beta
-0.020066*
-0.041871***

St.d Error
0.005875
0.005371

t-value
-3.415
-7.795

R2
0.0726
0.2897

dhi and pi11 variables and Table 3.5 reports the results of the convergence test: The results
suggest that there is indeed evidence of convergence with statistically significant negative
beta coefficients. For the regression of Ginis of dhi the negative beta coefficient is significant
at a 10% level and for the pi11 case it is significant at a 1% level.

3.5.2

Regional convergence within countries

To analyse whether the trend of convergence is also visible at the national level, it is instructive to take a closer look into the countries under observation. The disaggregation of
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Figure 3.4: Regional inequality convergence across developing countries

Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of LIS microdata
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LIS data to the regional level allows for an in-depth insight into subnational inequality convergence in developing countries. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 depict convergence charts for Brazil,
Colombia, Georgia, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, South Africa and Uruguay, thus
providing the most complete analysis of inequality convergence in developing countries to
date. At first sight, the majority of these charts, show downward-sloping convergence lines,
suggesting regional inequality convergence within developing countries.
Table 3.6 shows convergence tests for disposable household income. The results show
strong evidence of convergence in Colombia, Georgia, Guatemala, and Uruguay at the 1%
confidence level, as well as in Panama and Paraguay at the 5% level. There is no evidence
of convergence in Brazil, Peru and South Africa, despite negative coefficients.
For personal wage income, the results are largely in line with those of disposable household
income, except for Paraguay where there is no longer evidence of inequality convergence and
for South Africa where there is evidence of inequality convergence using personal labor
income. For Paraguay this results suggest that redistributive policies at the national level
play a role in fostering inequality convergence. In South Africa on the other hand, there is
evidence that redistributive policies do not play a role in fostering convergence, but instead
lead to divergent outcomes. This could be due to the hybrid state system of South Africa,
which has elements of federalist policy making. Subchapter 5.4 will further explore the role
of the state system in fostering convergence.
An interesting insight that can be calculated using the regression coefficients is the Gini
coefficient to which regions will converge to. As suggested by Bournakis et al. (2020), this
can be deduced by dividing the absolute value of the intercept coefficient by the absolute
value of the beta coefficient. Table 3.6 reports these values for disposable household income.
For Uruguay, for instance, this value suggests a convergence to a Gini coefficient of 0.30,
which is around 0.02 points lower than the current median value. Table 3.7 shows the values
that Gini coefficients converge towards using personal wage income. As expected these values
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Figure 3.5: Regional Convergence within countries
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Table 3.6: Convergence Test - Gini (dhi)

Beta
Intercept
F-statistic
R-squared
Adj. R-squared
Observations
Convergence to

Beta
Intercept
F-statistic
R-squared
Adj. R-squared
Observations
Convergence to

BRA

COL

GEO

GUA

PAN

-0.3700
(0.2275)
0.1641
(0.1118)
2.645
0.09568
0.05951
27
-

-0.82080***
(0.10295)
0.36176***
(0.05029)
63.57
0.7517
0.7399
23
0.4407

-1.4872***
(0.2283)
0.5877***
(0.1042)
42.45
0.8414
0.8216
10
0.3952

-0.9091***
(0.1626)
0.3422***
(0.0721)
31.24
0.6097
0.5902
22
0.3764

-0.57025**
(0.13007)
0.21395
(0.05904)
19.22
0.6578
0.6236
12
0.3752

PAR

PER

SAF

URU

-0.63558**
(0.19404)
0.30934**
(0.09902)
10.73
0.4339
0.3934
16
0.4867

-0.013924
(0.008388)
0.001120
(0.004225)
2.756
0.3147
0.2005
8
-

-0.5148
(0.2501)
0.2952
(0.1528)
4.237
0.2781
0.2125
13
-

-0.8560***
(0.12746)
0.26277***
(0.04827)
45.11
0.7263
0.7102
19
0.30
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Table 3.7: Convergence Test - Gini (pi11)

Beta
Intercept
F-statistic
R-squared
Adj. R-squared
Observations
Convergence to

Beta
Intercept
F-statistic
R-squared
Adj. R-squared
Observations
Convergence to

BRA

COL

GEO

GUA

PAN

-0.03700
(0.02275)
0.01641
(0.01118)
2.645
0.09568
0.05951
27
-

-0.068652***
(0.009061)
0.030194***
(0.004426)
57.41
0.7322
0.7194
23
0.443

-0.08513**
(0.03624)
0.03087*
(0.01644)
5.519
0.4082
0.3343
10
0.362

-0.05884**
(0.02557)
0.01967
(0.01388)
5.294
0.2093
0.1698
22
0.334

-0.08585***
(0.01583)
0.03438***
(0.00734)
29.39
0.7462
0.7208
12
0.400

PAR

PER

SAF

URU

-0.020123
(0.017645)
0.005548
(0.008682)
1.301
0.08501
0.01965
16
-

0.01302
(0.04981)
-0.01368
(0.02649)
0.06839
0.01127
-0.1535
8
-

-0.08000***
(0.02528)
0.04632**
(0.01578)
10.01
0.4549
0.4094
19
0.579

-0.082007***
(0.010173)
0.029782**
(0.004458)
64.99
0.7926
0.7805
13
0.363
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are higher than for disposable household income, given that the latter includes taxes and
transfers. However, for Georgia and Guatemala the value to which the Ginis converge to is
actually lower for personal wage income, which is an intriguing result that would warrant
further research.

3.5.3

Convergence club analysis

To implement the convergence club methodology, there is a need for several years/time periods of observation. Therefore, Guatemala and Paraguay are omitted from the convergence
club analysis. When additional waves of LIS data or additional annualized data will be made
available, the analysis of convergence clubs should be repeated to serve as useful analytical
tool to study inequality trends at the regional level in these countries.
The convergence club analysis enables the researcher and policy practitioner to gain
insights into heterogenous inequality convergence paths of regions. Table 3.8 shows the
convergence clubs of the countries under review for dhi Ginis. Figure 3.7 depicts them
graphically, showing the respective clubs in different colors. Brazil, which in the preceding
analysis showed no evidence of unconditional convergence over the entire sample of regions,
has 3 convergence clubs and one outlier unit. The outlying region is the region of Santa
Caterina, which showed a rapid reduction in inequality of around 0.05 points, despite low
initial levels of inequality in the base year 2006. The experience of Santa Caterina could serve
as a useful case study to analyze inequality reducing policies that could be emulated in other
regions. For Colombia, for which there is evidence of unconditional convergence, a further
breakdown of convergence trends can shed further light on the relative convergence paths
of regions. The analysis suggests two convergence clubs for Colombia, which are depicted
graphically on the upper right hand panel of Figure 3.7.
For Panama, there are two clubs as well as 1 outlier unit, namely Comarca Kuna Yala,
which had the lowest Gini coefficient in the base year 2007 and saw a marginal reduction
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Table 3.8: Convergence Clubs
Country

Conv. Clubs

Nr. of units

Beta

Std. Error

t-Value

Club 1
Club 2
Club 3 and 4
1 outlier unit

14
4
8

0.275
1.749
-0.548

1.23
0.725
0.464

0.224
2.411
-1.179

Colombia

Club 1
Club 2

14
9

-1.678
1.336

1.045
0.492

-1.605
2.717

Georgia

Club 1
Club 2

7
3

-0.987
-1.483

0.847
0.999

-1.165
-1.485

7
4

-0.456
-2.839

2.278
3.389

-0.2
-0.838

Brazil

Guatemala

NA

Panama

Club 1 and 2
Club 3
1 outlier unit

Paraguay

NA

Peru

Club 1
Club 2
1 outlier unit

4
3

0.377
5.868

0.573
0.458

0.657
12.807

South Africa

Club 1
1 outlier unit

12

-2.387

1.756

-1.359

Uruguay

Club 1 and 2
Club 2
Club 3

8
6
5

-0.345
0.33
-2.031

0.488
0.944
1.288

-0.707
0.349
-1.577
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over the 2007-2016 timeframe. Peru has two convergence clubs and one outlier unit, which is
the region of Costa Centro, which had the lowest Gini coefficient in the base year 2004 and
at the same time an above average reduction in inequality between 2004 and 2016. Again,
the policies and factors that lead to an above average reduction in inequality could provide
useful policy lessons that could be replicated in other regions. For South Africa, there is one
club and one outlier region and for Uruguay three clubs.
Convergence clubs can also be ”mapped”, as shown in Figure 3.8 below to provide insights
into potential geographic clustering. Panels a) and b) show the geographic representations
of the convergence clubs for Brazil and Panama. For Brazil, the clustering of clubs 1 and 3
in the North and South of the country, respectively, suggest that may be underlying factors
that explain geographic clustering. For Panama, the geographic clustering corresponds to
the location of the Panama canal through the central regions of convergence club 2. Further
research on the determinants of regional clusters is needed to provide further insights into
the cases of Colombia and Uruguay, shown in c) and d) respectively, which exhibit limited
evidence of clustering according to geographic determinants.

3.5.4

Inequality convergence and the state system

What insights can the results obtained so far yield on the role of subnational policy making
and the effect of the state system on inequality convergence? This is an important question
for researchers and policy makers alike. The countries that are part of the analysis in this
study do not only vary with regards to inequality convergence, but also with regards to
their institutional make-up and state system. The majority of the countries are unitary
state systems, in which decision and policy making are heavily centralized. Brazil and South
Africa stand out as countries with a federal and hybrid system, respectively.
Is there evidence that the state system matters with regards to inequality convergence?
The countries with unitary state systems with the exception of Peru show evidence of sub-
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Figure 3.8: Convergence clubs mapped
a) Brazil

b) Panama
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national inequality convergence. This is unsurprising as in a unitary state system common
national policy could translate into inequality convergence at the regional level. Peru is the
outlier in this sample. One explanation for this finding is that the regions for Peru contained in the sample are agglomerations of 26 smaller administrative regions of Peru, which
were combined for the survey. These units are thus not representative of policy-making or
administrative regions.
The only country with a federal state system, Brazil, shows no evidence of inequality convergence on the subnational level. Again, this is an unsurprising result, as different regional
policies can have varied impacts on the distribution of income. For South Africa, which has
a hybrid state system, there is evidence of convergence in wage income, as reported in Table
3.6. This may suggest that different redistributive policies may impact the distribution of
disposable household income, for which there is no evidence of inequality convergence. Yet,
analysis for South Africa faces the same issue as Peru, i.e. that the subnational units under
consideration in this study correspond to aggregated units that represent smaller administrative units. Results for Peru and South Africa should thus be considered with this caveat
in mind.
Overall, these results suggest that there is some (very) preliminary evidence that the state
system matters for subnational inequality convergence in developing countries: A unitary
state system corresponds to inequality convergence, while under federal systems different
regional policies lead to different regional inequality trends. Given the small size of the sample
of countries under review, this preliminary result should be further scrutinized through
additional research using a larger panel of countries, which will be possible once further LIS
data becomes available.
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Concluding Remarks

This research has found mixed evidence of regional inequality convergence for developing
countries. Across regions and countries evidence points to regional inequality convergence
across the 151 regions, for which LIS data is available. Within countries, the evidence is
mixed: six of the nine countries are showing evidence of unconditional inequality convergence.
The paper explores the role of the state system and greater regional policy autonomy on
inequality convergence, finding preliminary evidence that outcomes differ for unitary and
federal state systems. Further research with a larger sample of countries can shed further
light on the relationship between inequality convergence and the state system.
The paper contributes to the study of inequality convergence at the regional level by
introducing a first study of inequality convergence clubs in developing countries using LIS
data. The paper suggests that convergence club analysis can provide a useful complementary tool to explore inequality trends and thus inform and help target regional inequality
policy. Researchers and policy practitioners alike can use convergence clubs to study the
heterogeneity of convergence paths and identify regions that provide case studies that can
be emulated. The availability of LIS data disaggregated by region provides policy makers,
particularly from developing countries, for which other sources of data may be limited, an
ideal starting point to pursue inequality convergence analysis. Indeed, there is a strong case
for technical support in the use of convergence and convergence club methodologies to developing countries that may require it. Future releases of LIS data for a growing number of
developing countries will further enrich the analysis.
In ending this paper in the same way that it began, another quote from Atkinson (2004)
captures the way forward for inequality convergence analysis: ”LIS should ’carry on lissifying’. Continuity over time is essential to the use of LIS data. With each Wave, the data from
a new year become more valuable” (P. 182). This is certainly true for inequality convergence.
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Figure A.1: Geographical composition of historical regions of the Habsburg empire

Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of NUTS 3 data and historical maps
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Figure A.2: Geographical composition of historical regions of the Habsburg empire

Source: Author’s elaboration on the basis of NUTS 3 data and historical maps

Appendix B

Primary Sources for Social Tables
Hof- and Staats-Handbuch des Koenigreichs Bayern, 1886.
Preussische Statistik des Koeniglichen Statistischen Bureau, 1862.
Statistische Darstellung des Kreises Ahaus. 1861.
Statistische Darstellung des Kreises Beckum. 1862.
Statistische Darstellung des Kreises Bielefeld. 1863.
Statistische Darstellung vom Kreise Fraustadt 1862.
Statistische Darstellung des Kreises Habelschwerdt 1869.
Statistische Darstellung des Kreises Hamm. 1870.
Statistische Darstellung des Kreises Halle. 1863.
Statistische Darstellung des Kreises Lippstadt. 1863.
Statistische Darstellung des Kreises Luedinghausen. 1862.
Statistische Darstellung des Kreises Minden. 1863.
Statistische Darstellung des Kreises Moers 1863.
Statistische Darstellung des Kreises Muenster 1861.
Statistische Darstellung des Kreises Muensterberg 1861.
Statistische Darstellung des Kreises Nordhausen. 1863.
Statistische Darstellung des Kreises Pleschen. 1863.
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Statistische Darstellung des Kreises Paderborn 1859.
Statistische Darstellung des Kreises Schweidnitz 1863.
Statistische Darstellung des Kreises St. Goar, 1864.
Statistische Darstellung des Kreises Tecklenburg, 1864.
Statistische Darstellung des Kreises Weissensee, 1863.
Statistische Darstellung des Kreises Wiedenbrueck,1863
Statistische Darstellung des Kreises Worbis, 1867.
Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Koenigreich Bayern, 1894.
Zeitschrift des Koeniglich Preussischen Statistischen Bureaus, 1875.
Zeitschrift des Koeniglich Preussischen Statistischen Bureaus, 1897.
Zeitschrift des Koeniglich Saechsischen Statistischen Bureaus, 1894.
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Table B.1: Prussia: Income brackets and Pop. shares, 1874
Income Bracket, Thaler

Number of people

Pop. share, %

0-140

6447431

34.0284%

140-220

2194138

11.5803%

220-300

9231992

48.7248%

300-350

322287

1.7010%

350-400

137013

0.7231%

400-450

121505

0.6413%

450-500

94237

0.4974%

500-550

62517

0.3300%

550-600

59806

0.3156%

600-700

35440

0.1870%

700-800

44046

0.2325%

800-900

29096

0.1536%

900-1000

28138

0.1485%

1000-1200

40639

0.2145%

1200-1400

22539

0.1190%

1400-1600

16286

0.0860%

1600-1800

11041

0.0583%

1800-2000

7825

0.0413%

2000-2400

10814

0.0571%

2400-2800

6692

0.0353%

2800-3200

4994

0.0264%

3200-3600

3476

0.0183%

3600-4000

2564

0.0135%

4000-4800

3052

0.0161%

4800-5600

2018

0.0107%

5600-6400

1195

0.0063%

6400-7200

1336

0.0071%

7200-8400

1054

0.0056%

8400-9600

633

0.0033%

9600-10800

582

0.0031%

10800-12000

425

0.0022%

12000-14000

520

0.0027%
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Table B.2: Prussia: Income brackets and Pop. shares, 1874 (cont.d)
Income Bracket, Thaler

Number of people

Pop. share, %

14000-16000

317

0.0017%

16000-18000

314

0.0017%

18000-20000

196

0.0010%

20000-24000

308

0.0016%

24000-28000

185

0.0010%

28000-32000

105

0.0006%

32000-36000

86

0.0005%

36000-40000

46

0.0002%

40000-48000

91

0.0005%

48000-56000

53

0.0003%

56000-68000

49

0.0003%

68000-80000

37

0.0002%

80000-100000

24

0.0001%

100000-120000

14

0.0001%

120000-140000

13

0.0001%

140000-160000

3

0.0000%

160000-180000

3

0.0000%

180000-200000

4

0.0000%

200000-220000

2

0.0000%

240000-260000

10

0.0001%

260000-280000

2

0.0000%

300000-320000

1

0.0000%

380000-400000

1

0.0000%

480000-500000

1

0.0000%

500000-520000

1

0.0000%

600000-620000

3

0.0000%

700000-720000

1

0.0000%

1680000-1700000

1

0.0000%

18947202

100%

Total
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Table B.3: Saxony: Income brackets and Pop. shares, 1879
Income Bracket (Mark)

Number of people

Pop. share, %

0-300

77060

7.1039%

300-800

751626

69.2902%

800-950

57164

5.2698%

950-1100

39662

3.6563%

1100-1250

28142

2.5943%

1250-1400

17787

1.6397%

1400-1600

22507

2.0749%

1600-1900

20149

1.8575%

1900-2200

14362

1.3240%

2200-2500

10481

0.9662%

2500-2800

7104

0.6549%

2800-3300

9714

0.8955%

3300-4800

13215

1.2183%

4800-9600

10857

1.0009%

9600-26000

4091

0.3771%

26000-54000

592

0.0546%

54000-100000

170

0.0157%

100000-200000

50

0.0046%

200000-300000

12

0.0011%

300000-500000

4

0.0004%

500000-1000000

2

0.0002%

1084751

100%

Total
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Table B.4: Bavaria: Tax Groups and Pop. shares, 1882
Tax Group

Mean Income (Mark)

Number of people

Pop. share, %

Cat 2 - Step I

175

11982

2.1390%

Cat 1 - Step I

219

39349

7.0244%

Cat 1 - Step II

328.5

47535

8.4857%

Cat 2 - Step II

425

1603

0.2862%

Cat 3 - Step I

510

278585

49.7314%

Cat 1 - Step III

511

64521

11.5179%

Cat 2 - Step III

575

977

0.1744%

Cat 1 - Step IV

657

37995

6.7827%

Cat 2 - Step IV

750

1005

0.1794%

Cat 2 - Step V

925

778

0.1389%
0.1760%

Cat 2 - Step VI

1200

986

Cat 3 - Step II

1275

36862

6.5804%

Cat 2 - Step VII

1725

1347

0.2405%

Cat 3 - Step III

1790

15198

2.7131%

Cat 3 - Step IV

2225

4952

0.8840%

Cat 2 - Step VIII

2575

972

0.1735%

Cat 3 - Step V

2575

2614

0.4666%

Cat 3 - Step VI

2925

2572

0.4591%

Cat 3 - Step V

3275

2200

0.3927%

Cat 2 - Step IX

3675

548

0.0978%

Cat 3 - Step VI

3850

2956

0.5277%

Cat 2 - Step X

4675

292

0.0521%

Cat 3 - Step VII

4675

1784

0.3185%

Cat 2 - Step XI

5550

203

0.0362%

Cat 3 - Step VIII

5550

847

0.1512%

Cat 2 - Step XII

6500

111

0.0198%

Cat 3 - Step IX

7250

766

0.1367%

Cat 2 - Step XIII

8600

158

0.0282%

Cat 3 - Step X

10250

259

0.0462%

Cat 2 - Step XIV

11100

23

0.0041%

Cat 2 - Step XV

13800

16

0.0029%

Cat 3 - Step XI

13800

81

0.0145%

Cat 2 - Step XVI

18300

11

0.0020%

Cat 3 - Step XII

19200

51

0.0091%

Cat 2 - Step XVII

25500

3

0.0005%

Cat 3 - Step XIII

26400

17

0.0030%

Cat 2 - Step XVIII

30000

3

0.0005%

Cat 3 - Step XIV

30000

17

0.0030%

687.04

560179

100%

Total
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Table B.5: Bavaria: Social Table, 1882
Income (Mark)

Number of people

Pop. share, %

Unemployed

0.0

274749

10.1055%

Military service

73.0

121890

4.4832%

Maid

124.0

22590

0.8309%
3.0966%

Food industry

301.6

84192

Mining

313.9

13769

0.5064%

Mining industry

313.9

40123

1.4758%

Misc Industry

313.9

3306

0.1216%

Female Agric. Worker

328.5

50255

1.8484%

Agric./Day Laborer

359.5

1035486

38.0860%

Forestry

368.3

12924

0.4754%

Domestic worker

438.0

95977

3.5301%

Transportation

500.1

39207

1.4421%

Engine fitter

545.0

28165

1.0359%

Textile industry

545.0

61362

2.2569%
0.4005%

Chemical industry

572.0

10890

Paper industry

572.0

21305

0.7836%

Male Agric. Worker

584.0

407347

14.9825%

Clothing industry/Tailor/Hatmaker

619.0

139651

5.1365%

Assistant Teacher

663.0

1446

0.0532%

Metalworker

670.8

54606

2.0085%

Substitute Teacher

774.0

1729

0.0636%

Wood industry

805.0

61403

2.2585%

Printing

980.7

6853

0.2521%

Teacher

1236.0

12296

0.4523%

Construction

1277.5

100468

3.6953%

Surveyor/Inspector

1565.0

256

0.0094%

Civil servant

1366.9

3631

0.1336%

Insurance/Bank

2040.0

781

0.0287%

Financial administration

2297.2

2126

0.0782%

Judicial civil servant

2643.8

2723

0.1002%

Misc. Councils

2890.0

1491

0.0548%

High school teacher

3182.0

4869

0.1791%

University professor

3784.0

647

0.0238%

Higher civil service

4746.2

150

0.0055%

Ministerial council

7290.0

20

0.0007%
0.0010%

Higher civil service

7920.0

27

Government commissioner

10800.0

99

0.0036%

President of supreme court

12600.0

1

0.0000%

436.3

2718683

100%

Total
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